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The Aggregate Effects of                
Labor Market Frictions 
Michael W. L. Elsby       Ryan Michaels       David Ratner1 
December 24, 2016 
Abstract 
Labor market frictions distort the path of aggregate employment by impeding the 
flow of labor across firms. For a canonical class of frictions, we show how observable 
measures of such flows can be used to assess the effect of frictions on aggregate 
employment dynamics. Application of this approach to establishment microdata for 
the United States reveals that the empirical flow of labor across firms deviates 
markedly from the predictions of canonical labor market frictions. Firm-size flows 
react sluggishly to aggregate shocks in the data, but are predicted to respond 
aggressively in theory. The paper therefore concludes that the propagation 
mechanism embodied in standard models of labor market frictions fails to account 
for the sources of observed employment dynamics. 
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What are the effects of labor market frictions on aggregate employment dynamics? In 
this paper, we provide a new approach to this question for a canonical class of frictions. 
This class encompasses influential models of fixed adjustment costs that induce 
intermittent, discrete adjustments (Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger 1997); per-worker 
hiring and firing costs that induce further distortions to the magnitude of adjustments 
(Bentolila and Bertola 1990; Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993); and search and matching 
frictions (Pissarides 1985; Mortensen and Pissarides 1994). 
These models of labor market frictions are a compelling class to study, from both 
micro- and macro-economic perspectives. First, they are able to capture a key stylized 
fact of microeconomic establishment dynamics, namely the empirical prevalence of 
inaction in employment adjustment. Second, to differing degrees, they are also able to 
propagate aggregate shocks and induce sluggishness in aggregate employment dynamics, 
thereby contributing to a key stylized fact of macroeconomic adjustment. Thus, models 
in this class provide potentially fertile ground for an explanation of the 
microfoundations of aggregate employment dynamics. And, any successful explanation 
in this class will imply a prominent aggregate role for labor market frictions. Perhaps for 
these reasons, such models inform a large body of modern research on aggregate labor 
markets.2 
Our contribution in this paper is to inspect the channel through which canonical 
labor market frictions distort the path of aggregate employment, and to confront it with 
novel empirical evidence. All models of frictions in this class propagate aggregate 
employment dynamics by restricting the incidence and size of employment adjustment, 
thereby retarding the flow of labor across the firm-size distribution. Crucially, these 
firm-size flows can be measured in establishment panel data, opening up the possibility 
of an empirical evaluation of the propagation mechanism embodied in a large class of 
canonical models.  
Our findings suggest that standard labor market frictions provide a poor account of 
the dynamics of firm-size flows. Under these models, we show that the flows are 
predicted to respond aggressively to aggregate shocks. Intuitively, since the frictions 
retard the flow of labor, there is a “pent-up” demand for adjusting, which implies that 
the flows (though dampened in levels) are very elastic to shifts in the aggregate state. In 
the data, however, firm-size flows evolve sluggishly following macroeconomic 
disturbances. Since the behavior of these flows lies at the heart of the propagation 
mechanism inherent in all models in this canonical class, this failure suggests that 
standard frictions also provide a poor account of the empirical sources of aggregate 
                                      
2  An exhaustive list of models in this class is too numerous to cite. Additional examples include 
Hamermesh (1989), Caballero and Engel (1993) and Bachmann (2012) for fixed costs; Oi (1962) and 
Nickell (1978) for linear frictions; and Elsby and Michaels (2013) and Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014) for 
“large-firm” extensions of search frictions. Further prominent studies that consider hybrids of these 
frictions include Bertola and Caballero (1990), Mortensen and Nagypal (2007), Bloom (2009), Pissarides 
(2009), and Cooper, Haltiwanger and Willis (2007, 2015). 
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employment persistence. While they may account for microeconomic inaction, and 
aggregate persistence, they do so at the cost of predicting counterfactual microdata on 
the firm-size flows through which these observations are linked. 
We begin in section 1 by establishing the theoretical results that will inform our 
later empirical analysis. Here, we show that intermittent adjustment implies that only a 
fraction of desired, frictionless adjustments are implemented, retarding flows of labor to 
and from each firm size relative to an economy without frictions. In addition, distortions 
to the magnitude of adjustments induced by per-worker or search frictions further divert 
inflows away from their frictionless destination. By obstructing these firm-size flows, 
labor market frictions distort aggregate employment, since the latter is proportional to 
the mean of the firm-size distribution. 
In general, however, the flows to and from each position in the firm-size distribution 
are functions of the employment level at each position, and are thus complicated objects 
to distil. We show in section 1 how it is possible to devise a single summary statistic for 
the behavior of the firm-size flows which, in theory, provides a diagnostic for their 
aggregate effects. This summary statistic is the mean of a notional firm-size distribution 
associated with flow balance—that is, the distribution that equates inflows to outflows 
at each employment level. We show that a robust implication of canonical models is 
that aggregate flow-balance employment exhibits an overshooting property relative to 
its frictionless counterpart, rising more than frictionless employment in aggregate 
expansions, and declining more in recessions. This behavior of flow-balance employment 
reflects the fast-moving dynamics of the firm-size flows.3 
This overshooting property is shaped by two economic forces: a partial equilibrium 
effect that holds in the absence of adjustment of wages; and a further equilibrium effect 
induced by such wage adjustment. In partial equilibrium, the response of aggregate 
flow-balance employment to a positive aggregate shock captures a rightward shift in the 
distribution of desired employment, just as aggregate frictionless employment does. In 
addition, it reflects an increased propensity of firms to adjust to versus from high 
employment levels; the elasticity of these cross-sectional flows is a critical component of 
the model’s dynamics. Consequently, mean flow-balance employment responds at least 
as much as its frictionless counterpart to aggregate shocks. 
Equilibrium wage adjustment reinforces this property. Consider a rise in aggregate 
labor productivity. To the extent that labor market frictions attenuate the response of 
labor demand, equilibrium wages will rise less in the presence of frictions than in their 
                                      
3 These fast-moving dynamics of the firm-size flows are reminiscent of earlier findings in related literature 
on price and capital frictions. For example, Calvo models of price setting, in which the adjustment 
probability is an exogenous constant, fail to capture the sluggishness of average price changes—i.e., 
aggregate inflation (Fuhrer and Moore 1995; Mankiw and Reis 2002). Similarly, Veracierto’s (2002) early 
study of the special case of irreversible investment found numerically that the model failed to capture the 
sluggishness of average capital changes—aggregate investment. (See also Christiano and Todd 1996.) Our 
results show analytically that the origins of such findings lie in the behavior of firm-size flows, can be 
generalized to a much wider class of frictions, and can be tested using microdata on firm dynamics. 
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absence. Hence, aggregate flow-balance employment is conditional on a smaller increase 
in wages. Equivalently, the rise in equilibrium frictionless employment is choked off to a 
greater extent by rises in wages. For this reason, the equilibrium response of aggregate 
flow-balance employment is further amplified relative to its frictionless counterpart.  
We confirm these properties of canonical models in two sets of complementary 
results. The first establishes analytical results for popular special cases of the models in 
which frictionless labor demand evolves within each firm according to a random walk, 
and aggregate disturbances are unanticipated and permanent. The second explores 
numerical simulations that relax these assumptions. These theoretical results reveal that 
models in this class, especially variants with linear and search frictions, can induce 
significant propagation in aggregate employment dynamics. However, at the same time, 
all such models imply considerable overshooting of flow-balance employment relative to 
frictionless employment.  
The upshot of section 1, then, is that frictions in this class may distort the path of 
aggregate employment, but only by virtue of their ability to restrain the flow of labor 
across firms. However, while such frictions dampen the level of the cross sectional flows, 
these flows are predicted to be highly elastic to aggregate shocks. A consequence is that 
employment under flow balance responds to shocks even more aggressively than its 
frictionless counterpart. A natural question is whether available data are consistent with 
such a stark response of firm-size flows, as summarized by aggregate flow-balance 
employment. 
In section 2, we confront these implications of canonical models with empirical 
counterparts measured using rich establishment microdata. The data we use are derived 
from the U.S. Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages for the period 1992Q1 
through to 2014Q2. Being a natural establishment panel, these data enable us to 
observe the outflows from, and inflows to, each employment level in the employer-size 
distribution. Accordingly, we can derive an empirical measure of aggregate employment 
implied by flow balance along the lines suggested by the theoretical work of section 1.  
Using this measure, we present the results of several exercises that assess the 
empirical relevance of the propagation mechanism in this class of models. An initial, 
revealing finding is that the empirical time series for aggregate flow-balance employment 
tracks very closely the time series for actual, observed aggregate employment. 
Intuitively, it is hard to reconcile such an observation with the prediction of this class of 
models that flow-balance employment must overshoot its frictionless (let alone its 
observed) counterpart.  
We formalize this intuition in three further empirical exercises. For all of them, we 
begin by selecting a parameterization of the adjustment frictions that replicates the 
sluggishness of observed aggregate employment. We find that a relatively large linear 
friction is needed to achieve this. 
The first exercise then finds a sequence of aggregate shocks to match the empirical 
time series of observed aggregate employment in our data, and compares the model-
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implied series for flow-balance employment with its analogue in the data. Consistent 
with the above intuition, the model-implied series for flow-balance employment is much 
more volatile than its empirical counterpart, exhibiting around 50 percent more peak-to-
trough variation around recessions. 
The second exercise provides a further illustration of this result by comparing the 
dynamic correlations between aggregate flow-balance employment and labor 
productivity in model and data. By construction, the parameterized model generates an 
impulse response of actual observed employment to labor productivity that resembles its 
sluggish, hump-shaped analogue in the data. However, while the empirical impulse 
response of flow-balance employment is only modestly less persistent and hump-shaped 
than that for actual employment, the model-implied response exhibits very volatile, 
jump dynamics with respect to labor productivity. 
In a final exercise, we directly compare impulse responses of measures of the inflows 
to, and outflows from, three employment size classes in both model and data. 
Qualitatively consistent with models that feature canonical frictions, positive 
innovations to output-per-worker in the data are associated with an increase in the 
share of firms adjusting to, rather than from, higher employment levels. But, in stark 
contrast to the predictions of such models, the empirical impulse responses of firm-size 
flows are sluggish, hump-shaped and an order of magnitude smaller than their model-
implied counterparts. This finding confirms that the differences between model-implied 
and observed flow-balance employment can be traced to the fast-moving dynamics of 
the firm-size flows under canonical frictions.  
The results of these exercises form the basis of our conclusion that canonical models 
provide a poor account of the propagation mechanism underlying observed employment 
persistence. In the concluding section of the paper, we speculate on potential resolutions 
of this failure. A particularly satisfying resolution would be one that acknowledges the 
prominent microeconomic observation of inaction in employment adjustment, and 
explores its interactions with other frictions that can account for our observation of 
sluggishness in the flow of labor across firms. We suggest one example in which costs of 
adjusting employment interact with information frictions, which builds on and borrows 
from applications of related ideas in the price setting literature, among others. 4  A 
distinctive feature of canonical labor market frictions is that they render employment 
decisions partially irreversible. Consequently, information frictions induce a natural 
signal extraction problem whereby firms adjust to aggregate disturbances to the extent 
that they are perceived to be permanent, and render desired employment flows sluggish, 
as we observe in establishment microdata. 
 
                                      
4 Gorodnichenko (2010) and Alvarez, Lippi, and Paciello (2011) are two recent contributions to the 
literature that integrates menu costs of price adjustment and information frictions. 
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1. Labor market frictions and firm size dynamics 
In this section we first formalize the observation that canonical labor market frictions 
affect aggregate employment by impeding the flow of firms across different firm sizes. 
We then use the implied structure of these firm size dynamics to motivate a summary 
statistic for their behavior, which enables us to characterize tractably key properties of 
canonical models. Another virtue of this measure that we take up in later sections is 
that it can be measured directly from establishment microdata. 
1.1 Fixed costs 
A leading model of labor market frictions postulates the presence of a fixed cost of 
adjusting employment, independent of the scale of adjustment. The early work of 
Hamermesh (1989) suggested that such a friction could account for important features 
of establishment employment dynamics, an observation that informed the later 
influential empirical analyses of Caballero and Engel (1993) and Caballero, Engel and 
Haltiwanger (1997).5 In what follows we review the well-understood distortions of firms’ 
labor demand policies induced by this friction. More importantly for our purposes, we 
use this to infer the implications for firm size flows, and thereby aggregate employment.   
With regard to the structure of labor demand, the key implication of a fixed cost is 
that employment will be adjusted only intermittently and, upon adjustment, 
discretely—adjustment will be “lumpy.” Thus, labor demand takes the form of a 
threshold “Ss” policy, illustrated in Figure 1A:  
 𝑛 = {
𝑛∗ if 𝑛∗ > 𝑈(𝑛−1),
𝑛−1 if 𝑛
∗ ∈ [𝐿(𝑛−1), 𝑈(𝑛−1)],
𝑛∗ if 𝑛∗ < 𝐿(𝑛−1).
 (1) 
Here 𝑛∗ is the level of employment that a firm chooses if it adjusts. Under the Ss policy, 
a firm’s current employment 𝑛 is adjusted away from its past level 𝑛−1 whenever 𝑛
∗ 
deviates sufficiently from 𝑛−1, as dictated by the triggers 𝐿(𝑛−1) < 𝑛−1 < 𝑈(𝑛−1). 
Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995, 1997) refer to 𝑛∗ as mandated employment, 
interpreted as the level of employment the firm would choose if the friction were 
suspended for the current period. In principle, the latter is distinct from frictionless 
employment, which emerges if the fixed cost is suspended indefinitely. For reasonably 
calibrated models within this canonical class, however, the dynamics of mandated and 
frictionless employment are very similar. 6  Henceforth, then, we shall refer to 𝑛∗  as 
frictionless, or desired, employment. 
                                      
5 See also King and Thomas (2006), Cooper, Haltiwanger and Willis (2007, 2015), and Bachmann (2012). 
6 This has been proved analytically for the case of a plausibly small fixed adjustment cost (Gertler and 
Leahy 2008; Elsby and Michaels 2014). In the online Appendix, we also verify numerically that the 
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The dynamics of aggregate employment implied by the firm behavior in equation (1) 
can be inferred from its implications for firm size flows. Imagine the economy enters the 
period with a density of past employment, ℎ−1(⋅), and that realizations of idiosyncratic 
and aggregate shocks induce a density of desired employment ℎ∗(⋅). Our strategy is to 
infer a law of motion for the current-period density ℎ(⋅) implied by equation (1). This in 
turn will imply a path for aggregate employment in the economy, which we denote by 
𝑁, since the latter is captured by the mean of the density, 𝑁 ≡ ∫ 𝑚ℎ(𝑚)𝑑𝑚.   
The adjustment policy in Figure 1A suggests a straightforward approach to 
constructing a law of motion for the firm-size density ℎ(⋅). Consider first the outflow of 
mass from some employment level 𝑚. Among the ℎ−1(𝑚) mass of firms that enter the 
period with 𝑚 workers, only the fraction whose desired employment 𝑛∗ lies outside the 
inaction region [𝐿(𝑚), 𝑈(𝑚)] will choose to incur the adjustment cost and leave the 
mass. Symmetrically, now consider the inflow of mass to employment level 𝑚. Among 
the ℎ∗(𝑚) mass of firms whose desired employment is equal to 𝑚, only the fraction 
whose inherited employment 𝑛−1  lies outside of the inverse inaction region 
[𝑈−1(𝑚), 𝐿−1(𝑚)] will choose to incur the adjustment cost and flow to 𝑚. Thus, the 
change in the mass at employment level 𝑚 follows the law of motion 
 𝛥ℎ(𝑚) = 𝜏(𝑚)ℎ∗(𝑚) − 𝜙(𝑚)ℎ−1(𝑚), (2) 
where 𝜏(𝑚) and 𝜙(𝑚) are respectively the probabilities of adjusting to and from an 
employment level 𝑚, 
 𝜏(𝑚) = Pr(𝑛−1 ∉ [𝑈
−1(𝑚), 𝐿−1(𝑚)]|𝑛∗ = 𝑚) , and 
𝜙(𝑚) = Pr(𝑛∗ ∉ [𝐿(𝑚), 𝑈(𝑚)]|𝑛−1 = 𝑚). 
(3) 
Formal derivations of equations (2) and (3) are provided in the Appendix. 
The role of frictions in shaping the evolution of aggregate employment is evident in 
equations (2) and (3). In the absence of frictions, the probabilities of adjusting to and 
from 𝑚  are given by 𝜏(𝑚) =  1 = 𝜙(𝑚) . Hence, (2) collapses to Δℎ(𝑚) = ℎ∗(𝑚) −
ℎ−1(𝑚): any gap between the initial and frictionless densities is closed immediately. 
Thus, frictions distort the path of the firm size density, and thereby aggregate 
employment, by impeding the flows of labor across firms, in the sense that 𝜏(𝑚) , 
𝜙(𝑚) ∈ (0,1). 
1.2 An empirical diagnostic 
With this theoretical law of motion in hand, our next step is to consider which of its 
components can be measured empirically using available data. As we shall see, 
establishment-level panel data allow one to observe much of equation (2): One can 
                                                                                                                       
distinction between frictionless and mandated employment is quantitatively inconsequential for the results 
we report below. 
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measure the mass at each employment level at each point in time, ℎ−1(𝑚) and ℎ(𝑚); 
one can also observe the fraction of establishments at each employment level that 
adjusts away, 𝜙(𝑚), as well as the total inflow, 𝜏(𝑚)ℎ∗(𝑚).7 
Our point of departure is to note that, for fixed adjustment rates 𝜏(𝑚) and 𝜙(𝑚), 
the firm size density will converge to a position where the inflow of mass to each 𝑚 is 
balanced by outflows from that point. This flow balance condition implies a density 
 ℎ̂(𝑚) ≡
𝜏(𝑚)
𝜙(𝑚)
ℎ∗(𝑚). (4) 
ℎ̂(𝑚) is useful for several reasons. First, it can be measured straightforwardly, since 
it requires knowledge only of the total inflow, 𝜏(𝑚)ℎ∗(𝑚), and the probability of outflow 
𝜙(𝑚), both of which are observed in establishment panel data.   
Second, we argue in what follows that the mean of the flow balance density offers a 
single summary statistic that conveys the effects of canonical frictions on the dynamics 
of firm-size flows, and thereby on the dynamics of aggregate employment. Specifically, 
note that, using (4), the aggregate employment level implied by flow balance, ?̂? ≡
∫ 𝑚ℎ̂(𝑚)𝑑𝑚, can be written as 
 ?̂? = 𝑁∗ + 𝑐𝑜𝑣ℎ∗ (𝑚,
𝜏(𝑚)
𝜙(𝑚)
), (5) 
where 𝑐𝑜𝑣ℎ∗ denotes a covariance taken with respect to the distribution of frictionless 
employment, ℎ∗(𝑚). 
Equation (5) reveals that aggregate employment under flow balance ?̂?  will 
overshoot the path of aggregate frictionless employment 𝑁∗  under a monotonicity 
condition—namely that firms on average are more likely to adjust to versus from high 
(low) employment levels following positive (negative) innovations to aggregate 
frictionless employment. This implies that, after a positive innovation, 𝜏(𝑚)/𝜙(𝑚) will 
decline for low 𝑚 (since fewer firms adjust to versus from low 𝑚) and rise for high 𝑚 
(since more firms adjust to versus from high 𝑚). Thus, 𝜏(𝑚)/𝜙(𝑚) “tilts up” with 
respect to 𝑚, raising the covariance term in (5). Under this condition, ?̂? will rise more 
than 𝑁∗ when the latter rises, and fall more than 𝑁∗ when it falls. 
The monotonicity condition that underlies this intuition is closely related to the 
selection effect that has been emphasized in the literature on adjustment frictions 
(Caballero and Engel 2007; Golosov and Lucas 2007). This refers to a property shared 
by state-dependent models of adjustment whereby the firms that adjust tend to be those 
                                      
7 That we can observe only the total inflow, 𝜏(𝑚)ℎ∗(𝑚), rather than its constituent parts, is of course a 
perennial identification problem in this literature. If one could measure both 𝜏(𝑚) and ℎ∗(𝑚), the latter 
would allow one to infer a measure of aggregate frictionless employment 𝑁∗ ≡ ∫ 𝑚ℎ∗(𝑚)𝑑𝑚. Comparison 
of 𝑁∗ with the observed path of actual aggregate employment 𝑁 would then indicate the wedge between 
these two induced by the adjustment friction. 
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with the greatest desired adjustment. By the same token, firms in these models also will 
adjust in the direction of the desired adjustment. 
The forgoing intuition can be formalized tractably in standard models of fixed 
adjustment frictions, such as that set out in Caballero and Engel (1999). In this 
environment, firms face an isoelastic production function 𝑦 = 𝑝𝑥𝑛𝛼 that is subject to 
idiosyncratic shocks 𝑥. Firms thus face the following decision problem 
 𝛱(𝑛−1, 𝑥) ≡ max
𝑛
{𝑝𝑥𝑛𝛼 − 𝑤𝑛 − 𝐶+𝕀[𝑛 > 𝑛−1] − 𝐶
−𝕀[𝑛 < 𝑛−1] + 𝛽𝔼[𝛱(𝑛, 𝑥
′)|𝑥]}, (6) 
where 𝑝 denotes (for now, fixed) aggregate productivity, 𝑤 the wage, and 𝐶+/− the fixed 
costs of adjusting employment up and down.  
Caballero and Engel show that, if idiosyncratic shocks follow a geometric random 
walk, ln 𝑥′ = ln 𝑥 + 𝜀𝑥
′ , and the adjustment costs 𝐶+/− are scaled to be proportional to 
the firm’s frictionless labor costs, the labor demand problem has a tractable 
homogeneity property. This has two useful implications: First, the adjustment triggers 
in (1) are linear and time invariant, 𝐿(𝑛−1) = 𝐿 ⋅ 𝑛−1 and 𝑈(𝑛−1) = 𝑈 ⋅ 𝑛−1 for constants 
𝐿 < 1 < 𝑈. Second, desired (log) employment adjustments, ln(𝑛∗/𝑛−1), are independent 
of initial firm size 𝑛−1.
8 
Proposition 1 uses these properties of the canonical model to formalize the heuristic 
claim above that changes in aggregate employment under flow balance overshoot 
changes in aggregate frictionless employment. It assumes firms perceive aggregate 
productivity 𝑝 as fixed, and characterizes comparative statics with respect to a (one-
time) change in 𝑝. Because of the model’s loglinear structure, the result is most simply 
derived in terms of aggregate log frictionless employment, which we shall denote by 𝒩∗, 
and its counterpart under flow balance, ?̂?. 
Proposition 1 Consider the model of fixed adjustment costs (6). To a first-order 
approximation around a small change in aggregate log frictionless employment Δ𝒩∗, the 
change in aggregate log employment under flow balance, relative to a prior constant-𝒩∗ 
steady state, is 
 𝛥?̂? ≈
1 − 𝜖𝑤
1 − 𝜖𝑤∗
⋅ (1 + 𝜓) ⋅ 𝛥𝒩∗, (7) 
where 𝜓 > 0, and 𝜖𝑤 and 𝜖𝑤∗ are the elasticities, respectively with and without frictions, 
of equilibrium wages to aggregate productivity 𝑝. 
In Proposition 1, the response of ?̂? overshoots the frictionless response of 𝒩∗ for 
two reasons. The first is a partial equilibrium response: even if 𝜖𝑤 = 𝜖𝑤∗ =  0, 
Proposition 1 indicates that the change in aggregate log employment under flow balance 
                                      
8 The Appendix provides a formal statement and proof of this result in Lemma 1. 
 10 
strictly overshoots its frictionless counterpart This reflects the intuition conveyed by 
equation (5) that increases in desired employment 𝒩∗ are augmented in ?̂? by increases 
in the propensity to adjust toward higher employment levels. Put another way, frictions 
induce a “pent-up” demand for adjusting, such that the propensity to adjust reacts 
sharply after aggregate shocks and leads ?̂? to overshoot 𝒩∗. 
In addition, Proposition 1 reveals how differential equilibrium wage responses 
reinforce this overshooting property still further. To the extent that adjustment frictions 
restrict the response of labor demand to an aggregate shock, they also will restrict the 
response of equilibrium wages for a given labor supply schedule, 𝜖𝑤 < 𝜖𝑤∗ . It follows 
that (1 − 𝜖𝑤) (1 − 𝜖𝑤∗)⁄ > 1, further amplifying the equilibrium employment response 
under flow balance.  
While Proposition 1 has a number of virtues—it holds irrespective of whether 
adjustment is symmetric (𝐶+ = 𝐶−) or asymmetric (𝐶+ ≠ 𝐶−), for example—it also has 
limitations. It relies on the homogeneity of the canonical model implied by the 
assumption that idiosyncratic productivity, 𝑥 , follows a random walk. It is also a 
comparative statics result, describing the response of the economy to a change in 
aggregate labor demand, indexed by 𝑝, that is expected to occur with zero probability 
from the firms’ perspectives. For these reasons, in the next subsection, we explore the 
robustness of the overshooting result in numerical simulations that relax these 
assumptions. 
1.3 Quantitative illustrations 
We illustrate the dynamics of fixed costs models that resemble the canonical model 
described above, but with two differences. First, we relax the random walk assumption 
on idiosyncratic shocks, which we allow to follow a geometric AR(1), 
 ln 𝑥′ = 𝜌𝑥 ln 𝑥 + 𝜀𝑥
′ , where 𝜀𝑥
′ ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑥
2). (8) 
Second, we allow for the presence of aggregate productivity shocks, and for their 
stochastic process to be known to firms in the model. The evolution of these aggregate 
shocks also is assumed to follow a geometric AR(1), 
 ln 𝑝′ = 𝜌𝑝 ln 𝑝 + 𝜀𝑝
′ , where 𝜀𝑝
′ ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑝
2). (9) 
To mirror the timing of the data we use later in the paper, a period is taken to be 
one quarter. Based on this, we set the discount factor 𝛽 to 0.99, consistent with an 
annual interest rate of around 4 percent. To parameterize the remainder of the model, 
we appeal to the empirical literature that estimates closely related models of firm 
dynamics. 
The returns to scale parameter 𝛼  is set to 0.64, as in the estimates of Cooper, 
Haltiwanger, and Willis (2007, 2015). 
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The choice of parameters of the idiosyncratic productivity shock process (8) is 
informed by the estimates of Abraham and White (2006). They estimate a quarterly 
persistence parameter 𝜌𝑥 of approximately 0.7, which we implement. Our choice of the 
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic innovation 𝜀𝑥
′  of 𝜎𝑥 = 0.15 is set a little higher 
than Abraham and White’s estimate of 0.10, since the latter lies at the lower end of the 
range of estimates in the literature.9 
The parameters of the process for aggregate technology in (9) are chosen so that 
aggregate frictionless employment in the model exhibits a persistence and volatility 
comparable to aggregate employment in U.S. data. This yields 𝜌𝑝 =  0.95 and 𝜎𝑝 = 
0.018. Although frictions augment persistence, and dampen volatility, the intent is for 
the model environment to resemble broadly the U.S. labor market with respect to these 
unconditional moments. Importantly, the approach does not build in any persistence in 
employment conditional on technology. 
Finally, with respect to the adjustment cost, here we report results for the case of 
symmetric frictions, 𝐶+ = 𝐶− , the most common choice in the literature (see, for 
example, Bloom 2009). We explore three parameterizations that successively raise the 
friction to replicate a range of inaction rates. In the data used later in the paper, the 
observed fraction of firms that do not adjust employment quarter to quarter averages 
52.5 percent. We find that a fixed cost equal to 1.3 percent of quarterly revenue 
replicates this inaction rate. However, we also consider fixed costs that induce higher 
inaction rates, for two reasons. First, the latter calibration lies at the lower end of 
available estimates of fixed costs (Bloom 2009; Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis 2007, 
2015). Second, consistent with this, inaction rates measured at a year-to-year frequency 
lie closer to 40 percent, much higher than implied by a naïve extrapolation of the 
quarterly inaction rate. A natural explanation for this fact is that some quarter-to-
quarter shifts in employment reflect quits, which are subsequently replaced, rather than 
“active” employment adjustments that are subject to frictions and are the focus of 
canonical models. For these reasons, we also explore larger fixed costs that imply 
quarterly inaction rates of 67 percent and 80 percent. These correspond to adjustment 
costs of 2.7 percent and 5.8 percent of quarterly revenue, respectively, which also lie in 
the range of estimates in the literature. 
We solve the labor demand problem via value function iteration on an integer-
valued employment grid, 𝑛 ∈ {1,2,3 … }. The latter mirrors the integer constraint in the 
data, allowing one to construct the density ℎ̂(⋅) in the simulated data in the same way 
as we later implement in the real data. 
                                      
9 The Appendix derives these quarterly parameters from Abraham and White’s annual estimates and 
contrasts them with other values reported in related literature. It also shows that the dynamics of 
aggregate employment implied by reasonable changes in these parameters are qualitatively similar to 
those described here. 
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To simulate equilibrium wage responses, we impose an aggregate labor supply 
schedule. Based on the estimates of Chetty (2012) and Chetty et al. (2012), we 
parameterize the labor supply function to have a (constant) Frisch elasticity of 0.5.10 We 
maintain the same elasticity in the frictionless model. Chetty has argued that longer-run 
labor supply responses (e.g., Hicksian elasticities), which are arguably less influenced by 
frictions, imply a Frisch elasticity that is still no more than 0.5. 
To solve the model, we implement the bounded rationality algorithm of Krusell and 
Smith (1998), whereby firms condition their labor demands on a linear forecast rule that 
relates the log aggregate employment to its lag and aggregate productivity. We then 
iterate on the coefficients of this forecast rule until the firms’ simulated choices are 
consistent with the rule. 
Figure 2 plots simulated impulse responses of aggregate employment 𝑁, together 
with its frictionless and flow-balance counterparts, 𝑁∗  and ?̂?  respectively. The 
overshooting result anticipated in Proposition 1 is clearly visible in the model dynamics. 
For all three parameterizations of the adjustment cost our proposed diagnostic, ?̂? , 
responds more aggressively to the aggregate shock than frictionless employment 𝑁∗ . 
Moreover, the magnitude of the overshooting of ?̂? relative to 𝑁∗ is substantial in the 
model, responding on impact around twice as much to the impulse. 
These results provide a first example of how canonical frictions have clear 
predictions on the dynamics of firm size flows, as summarized by the dynamics of ?̂?—
namely, that they respond aggressively to aggregate shocks. Since these firm size flows 
reflect the channel through which frictions distort the path of aggregate employment, 
observable measures of such flows can be used to assess the empirical relevance of the 
propagation mechanism implied by canonical frictions. The next subsections extend this 
insight to two other popular models of labor market frictions. 
1.4 Linear costs 
Prominent alternative models of labor market frictions appeal instead to linear costs of 
adjustment in which the friction is discrete at the margin, and rises with the scale of 
adjustment. This class encompasses models of per-worker hiring and firing costs, 
including the contributions of Oi (1962), Nickell (1978), Bentolila and Bertola (1990), 
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), and Veracierto (2008). 
Relative to the fixed costs case examined above, linear frictions alter the structure 
of both labor demand and firm size dynamics. Although labor demand will continue to 
feature intermittent adjustment, a key difference is that, conditional on adjusting, firms 
                                      
10 Using survey questions about the long-run response to hypothetical wealth windfalls, Kimball and 
Shapiro (2010) estimate a median Frisch elasticity of 0.6 and a mean of 1. Consistent with Proposition 1, 
we have verified that aggregate employment under flow balance overshoots its frictionless counterpart 
even in the latter parameterization. Results are available on request. 
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will no longer discretely set employment to their frictionless target 𝑛∗. Rather, they will 
reduce the magnitude of hires and separations, shedding fewer workers when they 
shrink, and hiring fewer workers when they expand. Formally, the policy rule for 
separations, which we shall denote by 𝑙(⋅), will differ from the policy rule used for 
hiring, denoted 𝑢(⋅), inducing the continuous Ss policy illustrated in Figure 1B, 
 𝑛 = {
𝑢−1(𝑛∗) if 𝑛∗ > 𝑢(𝑛−1),
𝑛−1 if 𝑛
∗ ∈ [𝑙(𝑛−1), 𝑢(𝑛−1)],
𝑙−1(𝑛∗) if 𝑛∗ < 𝑙(𝑛−1),
 (10) 
where 𝑙(𝑛−1) < 𝑛−1 < 𝑢(𝑛−1) for all 𝑛−1. 
The key distinction, that the direction of adjustment must be taken into account in 
the presence of linear costs, also leaves its imprint on the law of motion for the firm size 
distribution. As before, the labor demand policy in Figure 1B motivates the form of this 
law of motion. This reveals that the structure of outflows is qualitatively unchanged—of 
the ℎ−1(𝑚)  density of firms currently at employment level 𝑚 , only those with 
frictionless employment outside the inaction region [𝑙(𝑚), 𝑢(𝑚)] will adjust away. But 
inflows are now differentiated by the direction of adjustment. The inflow of mass 
adjusting down to 𝑚 is comprised of firms whose past employment 𝑛−1 is greater than 
𝑚, and whose frictionless employment 𝑛∗ is equal to 𝑙(𝑚) < 𝑚. Likewise, the inflow of 
mass flowing up to 𝑚 consists of firms with 𝑛−1 < 𝑚 and 𝑛
∗ = 𝑢(𝑚) > 𝑚. 
Piecing this logic together yields the following law of motion for the firm size 
density, 
 𝛥ℎ(𝑚) = 𝜏𝑙(𝑚)ℎ𝑙
∗(𝑚) + 𝜏𝑢(𝑚)ℎ𝑢
∗ (𝑚) − 𝜙(𝑚)ℎ−1(𝑚). (11) 
Extending the interpretation of the fixed costs case above, here ℎ𝑙
∗(𝑚) = 𝑙′(𝑚)ℎ∗(𝑙(𝑚)) 
and ℎ𝑢
∗ (𝑚) = 𝑢′(𝑚)ℎ∗(𝑢(𝑚)) are the densities of employment that would emerge if all 
firms adjusted, respectively, according to the separation rule, 𝑙(𝑚), and hiring rule, 
𝑢(𝑚). However, only a fraction of firms will in fact adjust. The adjustment probabilities 
take the form 
 
𝜏𝑙(𝑚) = Pr(𝑛−1 > 𝑚|𝑛
∗ = 𝑙(𝑚)) , 
𝜏𝑢(𝑚) = Pr(𝑛−1 < 𝑚|𝑛
∗ = 𝑢(𝑚)) , and 
𝜙(𝑚) = Pr(𝑛∗ ∉ [𝑙(𝑚), 𝑢(𝑚)]|𝑛−1 = 𝑚), 
(12) 
where 𝜏𝑙(𝑚)  is the probability that a firm adjusts down to 𝑚 , while 𝜏𝑢(𝑚)  is the 
probability that a firm adjusts up to 𝑚. 
To construct the density under flow balance for the linear costs case note that, for 
fixed adjustment rates 𝜏𝑙(𝑚), 𝜏𝑢(𝑚) and 𝜙(𝑚), the law of motion (11) implies that the 
firm size density will converge to 
 
ℎ̂(𝑚) ≡
𝜏𝑙(𝑚)
𝜙(𝑚)
ℎ𝑙
∗(𝑚) +
𝜏𝑢(𝑚)
𝜙(𝑚)
ℎ𝑢
∗ (𝑚). 
(13) 
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Once again, the behavior of aggregate employment under flow balance can be 
formalized most straightforwardly in a canonical linear cost model in which firms face 
isoelastic production 𝑦 = 𝑝𝑥𝑛𝛼, and idiosyncratic shocks that follow a geometric random 
walk. 11  The key difference is that the adjustment friction is now scaled by the 
magnitude of adjustment, so that firms face the decision problem:12 
 𝛱(𝑛−1, 𝑥) ≡ max
𝑛
{𝑝𝑥𝑛𝛼 − 𝑤𝑛 − 𝑐+𝛥𝑛+ + 𝑐−𝛥𝑛− + 𝛽𝔼[𝛱(𝑛, 𝑥′)|𝑥]}. (14) 
A simple extension of Caballero and Engel’s (1999) homogeneity results for the fixed 
cost model can be used to show that if idiosyncratic shocks follow a geometric random 
walk, and if per-worker hiring and firing costs are proportional to wages, the adjustment 
triggers in (10) are linear and time invariant, 𝑙(𝑛) = 𝑙 ⋅ 𝑛 and 𝑢(𝑛) = 𝑢 ⋅ 𝑛 for constants 
𝑙 < 1 < 𝑢, and that desired (log) employment adjustments, ln(𝑛∗/𝑛−1), are independent 
of initial firm size 𝑛−1.
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As in Proposition 1 above for the fixed costs case, the latter properties allow one to 
relate the response of aggregate flow-balance log employment ?̂?  to the response of 
aggregate frictionless log employment 𝒩∗ following a change in aggregate productivity. 
Proposition 2 Consider the model of linear adjustment costs (14). To a first-order 
approximation around a small change in aggregate log frictionless employment 𝛥𝒩∗, the 
change in aggregate log employment under flow balance, relative to a prior constant-𝒩∗ 
steady state, is 
 𝛥?̂? ≈
1 − 𝜖𝑤
1 − 𝜖𝑤∗
⋅ 𝛥𝒩∗, (15) 
where 𝜖𝑤  and 𝜖𝑤∗  are the elasticities, respectively with and without frictions, of 
equilibrium wages to aggregate productivity 𝑝. 
Just as in the model of fixed costs, the response of ?̂? relative to 𝒩∗ is shown to be 
mediated by the wage elasticities 𝜖𝑤 and 𝜖𝑤∗, and is qualitatively independent of any 
asymmetries in the frictions 𝑐+ ≠ 𝑐−. In contrast to the fixed costs case, though, the 
extent to which ?̂? overshoots the frictionless response of 𝒩∗ now depends entirely on 
the response of equilibrium wages. 
For fixed wages, the response of ?̂?  no longer overshoots that of 𝒩∗ , but is 
approximately equal to it. The key difference is that firms adjust only partially toward 
                                      
11 Nickell (1978, 1986) first formalized the linear-cost model in the context of a labor demand model. 
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) introduced uncertainty into Nickell’s continuous-time formulation. Equation 
(14) is a discrete-time analogue to Bentolila and Bertola’s model (although the shocks need not be 
Gaussian, as in their paper). 
12 We use Δ𝑛+ and Δ𝑛− as shorthand for Δ𝑛𝕀[𝑛 > 𝑛−1] and Δ𝑛𝕀[𝑛 < 𝑛−1], respectively. 
13 Again, the Appendix provides a formal statement and proof of this result in Lemma 1. 
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their frictionless employment under linear frictions. A rise in 𝒩∗ places more firms on 
the hiring margin, where employment is set below its frictionless counterpart, and fewer 
firms on the separation margin, where employment exceeds its frictionless level. Both 
forces serve to attenuate the response of ?̂? relative to the fixed costs case. Proposition 2 
shows that, to a first order, this attenuation offsets exactly the partial equilibrium 
overshooting of the diagnostic ?̂? in the fixed costs case. 
The effects of differential equilibrium wage responses remain as before, however. 
Sluggish frictional responses of labor demand to an aggregate shock will induce sluggish 
equilibrium wage responses under frictions, such that 𝜖𝑤 < 𝜖𝑤∗. This again gives rise to 
overshooting, as shown in Proposition 2. 
Figures 3 and 4 show that the result of Proposition 2 is mirrored in numerical 
simulations of models that incorporate a general stationary process for idiosyncratic 
productivity, 𝑥, and a fully stochastic process for aggregate productivity, 𝑝. We again 
present results for three parameterizations of the friction, each of which induces a 
different inaction rate. The numerical methods and the details of the calibration 
strategy are as described in section 1.3. 
Figure 3 illustrates impulse responses of actual, frictionless and flow-balance 
aggregate employment in the presence of symmetric linear frictions where 𝑐+ = 𝑐−. As 
before, each panel of Figure 3 successively raises the friction to produce increasingly 
higher average rates of inaction in employment adjustment. Note that the response of 
actual employment becomes progressively more sluggish as the friction rises, which 
dampens the response of the wage. As foreshadowed by Proposition 2, the response of 
flow-balance employment therefore increasingly overshoots the frictionless path. 
Figure 4 in turn reveals that this result is unimpaired by the presence of asymmetric 
frictions, as suggested by Proposition 2. Its first three panels report results for 
successively higher hiring costs, 𝑐+ > 0 and 𝑐− = 0; the latter three panels do the same 
for firing costs, 𝑐− > 0 and 𝑐+ = 0. Strikingly, it is hard to discern differences between 
the impulse responses for hiring and firing costs, and between these and the impulse 
response for the symmetric case in Figure 3. 
The message of Figures 3 and 4, then, is that the insight of Proposition 2 is robust 
to empirically reasonable parameterizations of canonical models of linear frictions. This 
reinforces the message of section 1.3 that flow balance employment is indeed a useful 
summary statistic for the impact of canonical frictions on firm size dynamics, and 
thereby the effects of such frictions on aggregate employment dynamics. 
However, Proposition 2 does not allow the adjustment triggers to vary, since these 
are independent of 𝛥𝒩∗ under the time-invariant linear frictions we have consider thus 
far. This is a key distinction with respect to models of search frictions, to which we now 
turn. 
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1.5 Search costs 
The canonical Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model of search frictions, in which 
a single firm matches with a single worker, can be extended to a setting with “large” 
firms that operate a decreasing-returns-to-scale production technology (Acemoglu and 
Hawkins 2014; Elsby and Michaels 2013). The presence of search frictions implies two 
modifications to the canonical linear cost model studied above. 
First, search frictions induce a time-varying per-worker hiring cost. Hiring is 
mediated through vacancies, each of which is subject to a flow cost 𝑐, and is filled with 
a probability 𝑞 that depends on the aggregate state of the labor market. Under a law of 
large numbers, the effective per-worker hiring cost is thus 𝑐/𝑞, which varies over time 
with the vacancy-filling rate 𝑞. The typical firm’s problem therefore takes the form: 
 𝛱(𝑛−1, 𝑥) ≡ max
𝑛
{𝑝𝑥𝑛𝛼 − 𝑤(𝑛, 𝑥)𝑛 −
𝑐
𝑞
𝛥𝑛+ + 𝛽𝔼[𝛱(𝑛, 𝑥′)|𝑥]}. (16) 
Second, search frictions induce ex post rents to employment relationships over which 
a firm and its workers may bargain. In an extension of the bilateral Nash sharing rule 
invoked in standard one-worker-one-firm search models, Elsby and Michaels (2013) show 
that a marginal surplus-sharing rule proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) implies a 
wage equation of the form 
 𝑤(𝑛, 𝑥) = 𝜂
𝑝𝑥𝛼𝑛𝛼−1
1 − 𝜂(1 − 𝛼)
+ (1 − 𝜂)𝜔. (17) 
Here 𝜂 ∈ [0,1]  indexes worker bargaining power, and 𝜔  is the annuitized value of 
workers’ threat point. Bruegemann, Gautier and Menzio (2015) show that the marginal 
surplus-sharing rule underlying (17) can be derived from an alternating-offers bargaining 
game between a firm and its many workers in which the strategic position of each 
worker in the firm is symmetric. 
As before, we consider first a version of the search model with a tractable 
homogeneity property. Specifically, we study the case in which the friction, embodied in 
the vacancy cost, is proportional to the workers’ outside option, 𝑐 ∝ 𝛾𝜔.14 Under these 
assumptions, the Appendix shows that the homogeneity properties used for the models 
discussed in previous subsections continue to hold, with one exception: although the 
adjustment triggers remain linear, they no longer are invariant to shifts in aggregate 
productivity, for the simple reason that the friction, 𝑐 𝑞⁄ , varies with the aggregate 
state. 
                                      
14 This can be motivated through the presence of a dual labor market in which recruitment is performed 
by workers hired in a competitive market, who are paid according to the annuitized value of 
unemployment 𝜔.  
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Proposition 3 reveals that the result of Proposition 2 extends to search frictions, 
under a few restrictions. 
Proposition 3 Consider the model of search costs in (16) and (17). Assume (i) firms 
are patient, 𝛽 ≈ 1; (ii) frictions are small, 𝛾2 ≈ 0; and (iii) the distribution of 𝜀𝑥  is 
symmetric. Then, to a first-order approximation around a small change in aggregate log 
frictionless employment 𝛥𝒩∗ , the change in aggregate log employment under flow 
balance, relative to a prior constant-𝒩∗ steady state, is 
 𝛥?̂? ≈
1 − 𝜖𝜔
1 − 𝜖𝑤∗
𝛥𝒩∗, (18) 
where 𝜖𝜔  and 𝜖𝑤∗  are the elasticities of 𝜔  and frictionless wages 𝑤
∗  to aggregate 
productivity 𝑝. 
As in earlier results, Proposition 3 suggests that the responses of ?̂? and 𝒩∗ are 
shaped by both partial equilibrium and equilibrium forces, which we consider in turn. 
In partial equilibrium, Proposition 3 shows that the response of aggregate 
employment under flow balance ?̂?  still approximates the response of aggregate log 
frictionless employment 𝒩∗, but under a few additional restrictions. We argue in what 
follows that these restrictions are plausible. 
The first two restrictions—that firms are patient, and that frictions are small—are 
quantitative. We address their plausibility by examining results from a numerical model 
that does not impose these restrictions. This model sets the discount factor 𝛽 to match 
an annual interest rate of 4 percent, and sets 𝑐 to match evidence on recruitment costs.  
The numerical results will thus address the extent to which 𝛽 is close enough to one, 
and the friction sufficiently small, for the insight of Proposition 3 to hold. 
The third restriction concerns the symmetry of the distribution of idiosyncratic 
shocks. This can be justified along two grounds. First, it is conventional to implement 
shock processes with symmetrically distributed—typically Normal—innovations. Second, 
it is also consistent with the observed pattern of employment adjustment, which is close 
to symmetric (see Davis and Haltiwanger 1992, and Elsby and Michaels 2013, among 
others). 
These three restrictions aid the proof of Proposition 3, which is based on symmetry. 
If the firm is sufficiently patient (𝛽 ≈ 1), the cost of hiring in the current period implies 
an equal cost of firing in the subsequent period. As a result, one can show that the 
optimal policy is symmetric, to a first-order approximation around 𝛾 = 0, as long as the 
driving force 𝜀𝑥 is symmetric. In terms of the notation of the policy rules, this means the 
upper and lower adjustment triggers, 𝑢(𝑛−1) = 𝑢 ⋅ 𝑛−1 and 𝑙(𝑛−1) = 𝑙 ⋅ 𝑛−1, satisfy ln 𝑢 ≈
− ln 𝑙, and move by approximately the same amount in response to a shift in aggregate 
productivity. 
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As in preceding sections, we explore the robustness of the conclusion of our 
theoretical analysis by solving a numerical version of the model that relaxes the 
restrictions used in deriving the proposition. The numerical model extends (16) slightly 
by including a per-worker cost of hiring 𝑘 (akin to 𝑐+ in (14)) that is independent of the 
aggregate state of the labor market. Numerous authors have noted that a time-invariant 
cost of hiring aids the ability of search and matching models to generate realistic 
degrees of amplitude and persistence in employment (Mortensen and Nagypal 2007; 
Pissarides 2009; and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay 2016). 
We again present results for three parameterizations, each one targeting a different 
inaction rate. Details of our calibration strategy, as well as values of all structural 
parameters, can be found in the Appendix. Here, we describe the more salient structural 
parameters that underlie the elasticities, 𝜖𝑤∗  and 𝜖𝜔 , highlighted by Proposition 3. 
These elasticities measure, respectively, the flexibility of frictionless wages 𝑤∗ , and 
workers’ outside option in the presence of frictions 𝜔, to aggregate productivity 𝑝. 
As before, in the frictionless case 𝜖𝑤∗  is related to the Frisch elasticity of labor 
supply, which we again set to 0.5. This implies 𝜖𝑤∗ = 2/(3 − 𝛼) ≈ 0.848 when 𝛼 is set to 
equal 0.64.15  
The counterpart to 𝜖𝑤∗ in the search model, 𝜖𝜔 , depends on the structure of the 
worker’s threat point 𝜔, which in turn is shaped by the hiring costs faced by firms. 
These include 𝑐, the vacancy cost, as well as 𝑘. The vacancy cost is set such that the 
average cost of recruiting, 𝑐 𝑞⁄ , equals 14 percent of the quarterly wage, following Hall 
and Milgrom (2008) and Elsby and Michaels (2013). We then select the value of 𝑘 to 
match the three inaction rates studied in the preceding sections. 
Given this structure, a simple extension of the “large-firm” wage bargain 
implemented in Elsby and Michaels (2013) to this environment implies that 
 𝜔 =
𝜂
1 − 𝜂
(𝑐𝜃 + 𝑘𝑓(𝜃)) + 𝑏, (19) 
where 𝜃 is labor market tightness, the ratio of aggregate vacancies to unemployment,  
𝑓(𝜃) is the job-finding rate, and 𝑏 is the flow payoff to unemployment. Intuitively, since 
firms would have to pay both vacancy and hiring costs to replace a worker, both 
frictions act as a lever to raise his wage, and so both 𝑐 and 𝑘 enter into 𝜔. 
It remains to choose worker bargaining power, 𝜂 . We pin this down based on 
evidence from microdata on wages. Taking account of the shifting composition of 
employment over the business cycle, microdata-based estimates are broadly consistent 
with a rule of thumb that real wages are about as cyclical as employment (Solon, 
                                      
15 Strictly speaking, labor supply is inelastic in the canonical search model, and so the elasticity that 
would emerge absent frictions is zero. In principle, though, it is possible to compare the behavior of flow-
balance employment to the dynamics of any frictionless model. Accordingly, we benchmark against a 
more compelling frictionless alternative which uses a Frisch elasticity of 0.5. 
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Barsky, and Parker 1994; Elsby, Shin, and Solon 2016). Accordingly, we set 𝜂 to match 
an elasticity of average real wages with respect to aggregate employment approximately 
equal to one. This choice, in turn, implies the elasticity of the workers’ threat point to 
aggregate productivity, 𝜖𝜔. 
The implied magnitudes for 𝜖𝜔 are measured by the response of 𝜔 on impact of a 
shock to 𝑝 , consistent with the interpretation of Proposition 3. The results vary 
somewhat across the different parameterizations of the search friction. We find that 𝜖𝜔 
lies between 0.6 (when the frictions are set to induce an inaction rate of 52.5 percent per 
quarter) and 0.35 (when the frictions induce an inaction rate of 80 percent per quarter). 
Proposition 3 implies that the response of aggregate employment under flow balance 
should overshoot that of frictionless employment under these parameterizations, since 
(1 − 𝜖𝜔)/(1 − 𝜖𝑤∗) lies between 2.7 (in the case of a 52.5 percent inaction rate) and 4.3 
(in the case of  an 80 percent inaction rate). Figure 5 shows that this prediction of 
Proposition 3 is visible in numerical simulations of the model. As before, these are based 
on the methods and baseline parameterization described in section 1.3—that is, with 
stationary idiosyncratic shocks 𝑥, and fully stochastic aggregate shocks 𝑝. The impulse 
responses in Figure 5 suggest that aggregate employment under flow balance reacts on 
impact of the aggregate shock considerably more than its frictionless counterpart. 
2. Empirical implementation 
The previous section gave a theoretical rationale for how the aggregate effects of a class 
of canonical frictions are mediated through their effects on the dynamics of firm size 
flows, and how a summary statistic for these dynamics is provided by aggregate flow-
balance employment ?̂?. A key virtue of ?̂? is that it can be measured with access to 
establishment panel data on employment. In this section, we apply these results to a 
rich source of microdata from the United States. 
2.1 Data 
The data we use are taken from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
(QCEW). The QCEW is compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in concert 
with State Employment Security Agencies. The latter collect data from all employers in 
a state that are subject to the state’s Unemployment Insurance (UI) laws. Firms file 
quarterly UI Contribution Reports to the state agency, which provide payroll counts of 
employment in each month. These are then aggregated by the BLS, which defines 
employment as the total number of workers on the establishment’s payroll during the 
pay period that includes the 12th day of each month. Following BLS procedure, we 
 20 
define quarterly employment as the level of employment in the third month of each 
quarter.16 
From the cross-sectional QCEW data, the BLS constructs the Longitudinal 
Database of Establishments (LDE), which we use in what follows. Although data are 
available for the period 1990Q1 to 2014Q2, we restrict attention to data from 1992Q1 
due to difficulty in matching establishments in the first two years of the sample.17 
Sample restrictions. The QCEW data are a near-complete census of workers in the 
United States, covering approximately 98 percent of employees on non-farm payrolls. 
The dotted line in Figure 6 plots the time series of log aggregate employment in private 
establishments in the full QCEW sample. Relative to this full sample we apply three 
further sample restrictions, illustrated by the successive lines in Figure 6. 
First, our access to QCEW/LDE microdata is restricted to a subset of forty states 
that approved access onsite at the BLS for this project. As a result, our sample excludes 
data for Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New 
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
Second, we restrict our sample to continuing establishments with positive 
employment in consecutive quarters. Specifically, we construct a set of overlapping 
quarter-to-quarter balanced panels that exclude births and deaths of establishments 
within the quarter. Note that we do not balance across quarters, so births in a given 
panel will appear as incumbents in the subsequent panel (if they survive). We focus on 
continuing establishments because the canonical models of adjustment frictions analyzed 
above are intended to describe adjustment patterns among incumbent firms.18 
Our final sample restriction is to exclude establishments with more than 1000 
employees in consecutive quarters. We do this for practical reasons. To measure the 
flow-balance employment distribution in equations (4) and (13), and hence the 
diagnostic suggested by the theory, we require measures of establishment flows between 
points in the firm size distribution—specifically, inflows of mass to each employment 
level, and the probability of outflow. To measure the latter with sufficient precision 
requires sufficient sample sizes at all points in the distribution. Since establishments 
with more than 1000 employees comprise a very small fraction of U.S. establishments—
for example, less than 0.1 percent in 2014Q2—sample sizes become impracticably thin 
                                      
16 The count of workers includes all those receiving any pay during the pay period, including part-time 
workers and those on paid leave. 
17 Although the underlying microdata are available from 1990 on, the BLS does not publish data based 
longitudinally-matched data for 1990-1991 due to changes in administrative procedures for how firms 
reported their data over that period. 
18 In constructing our sample of continuers, we also exclude the small subset of establishments that are 
flagged as undergoing a potential change of ownership, since their employment adjustment may be subject 
to measurement error.  Those establishments, which the BLS attempts to link with their predecessor or 
successor, constitute only 0.1 percent of our total sample in 2014Q2. 
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beyond 1000 employees, inducing substantial noise in implied estimates of our 
diagnostic. 
Though the foregoing sample restrictions reduce the level of employment relative to 
the U.S. total, fluctuations in employment in our sample closely mimic the behavior of 
the published aggregate. Figure 6 reveals that, in terms of levels, the largest loss of 
sample size occurs because we are unable to access data for all states, accounting for 
around 30 percent of total employment in the United States. The further exclusion of 
non-continuing establishments and large establishments accounts, respectively, for 
around 2 percent and 10 percent of employment. However, Figure 6 shows that the path 
of aggregate employment in our sample resembles, in both trend and cycle, the path of 
aggregate employment in the full QCEW sample. The correlation between log aggregate 
employment in the published QCEW series for all states and that in our final microdata 
sample is 0.99. 
Measurement. To estimate our diagnostic, we require first an estimate of the 
distribution of employment under flow balance, ℎ̂(𝑚). Substituting equations (4) and 
(13) respectively into the laws of motion (2) and (11), we can write the density under 
flow balance as 
 ℎ̂𝑡(𝑚) = ℎ𝑡−1(𝑚) +
𝛥ℎ𝑡(𝑚)
𝜙𝑡(𝑚)
, (20) 
where 𝑡 indexes quarters, ℎ𝑡−1(𝑚) is the previous quarter’s mass of establishments with 
employment 𝑚, 𝛥ℎ𝑡(𝑚) ≡ ℎ𝑡(𝑚) − ℎ𝑡−1(𝑚) is the quarterly change in that mass, and 
𝜙𝑡(𝑚) is the fraction of establishments that adjusts away from an employment level of 
𝑚  in quarter 𝑡 . Thus, estimation of ℎ̂𝑡(𝑚) requires only an estimate of the outflow 
adjustment probability 𝜙𝑡(𝑚), in addition to measures of the evolution of the firm size 
distribution ℎ𝑡(𝑚). 
The simplest approach to measuring 𝜙𝑡(𝑚) is to use our microdata to compute the 
fraction of establishments with 𝑚  workers in quarter 𝑡  that reports employment 
different from 𝑚  in quarter 𝑡 + 1 . As alluded to above in motivating our sample 
restrictions, however, a practical issue that arises is that sample sizes become small as 𝑚 
gets large, inducing sampling variation in estimates of 𝜙𝑡(𝑚). 
We further address this issue by discretizing the employment distribution at large 
𝑚. An advantage of the substantial sample sizes in the QCEW/LDE microdata is that 
we can be relatively conservative in this regard. In particular, we allow individual bins 
for each integer employment level up to 250 workers. In excess of 99 percent of 
establishments lie in this range, and so sample sizes in each bin are large, between about 
100 and 1.3 million establishments. For establishment sizes of 250 through 500 workers 
we use bins of length five, allowing us to maintain sample sizes of at least 80 
establishments in each quarter. Further up the distribution, of course, sample sizes get 
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smaller, so we extend our bin length to ten for employment levels between 500 and 999 
workers. In this range, sample sizes are at least 15 establishments in each quarter. 
Denoting an individual bin by 𝑏, we estimate the firm size mass and the outflow 
probability as 
 ℎ𝑡(𝑏) = ∑ 𝕀[𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∈ 𝑏]
𝑖
, and 𝜙𝑡(𝑏) =
∑ 𝕀[𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∉ 𝑏|𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 ∈ 𝑏]𝑖
∑ 𝕀[𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 ∈ 𝑏]𝑖
, (21) 
where 𝑖 indexes establishments. We use these measures to compute the flow-balance 
mass in each bin according to equation (20) as ℎ̂𝑡(𝑏) = ℎ𝑡−1(𝑏) + [𝛥ℎ𝑡(𝑏) 𝜙𝑡(𝑏)⁄ ] . 
Finally, we compute aggregate employment and its flow-balance counterpart by taking 
the inner product of ℎ𝑡 and ℎ̂𝑡 with the midpoints of each bin, denoted 𝑚𝑏, 
 𝑁𝑡 = ∑ 𝑚𝑏ℎ𝑡(𝑏)
𝑏
, and ?̂?𝑡 = ∑ 𝑚𝑏ℎ̂𝑡(𝑏)
𝑏
. (22) 
2.2 Inferring the aggregate effects of frictions 
With this estimate of flow-balance aggregate employment ?̂?𝑡  in hand, we can now 
contrast its dynamics with the predictions of the canonical models summarized in 
section 1, and in Figures 2 through 5.  
A first look at the data. Figure 7 plots the time series of 𝑁𝑡 and ?̂?𝑡 derived from 
application of equation (22) to the QCEW/LDE microdata. Both series are expressed in 
log deviations from a quadratic trend.19 Figure 7 reveals that ?̂?𝑡 is a leading indicator of 
actual employment 𝑁𝑡, and is also more volatile. Specifically, the standard deviation of 
𝑁𝑡 is 0.025, whereas the standard deviation of ?̂?𝑡 is 0.031. 
On the whole, however, the differences between the two series are modest. The 
median (mean) absolute difference between the series is just 0.5 (0.8) log points. Indeed, 
there is remarkably little daylight between the two series between 1992 and 2008. Even 
in the 2001 recession, flow-balance employment very closely tracks the drop in actual 
employment. The only substantial difference between the series emerges in the Great 
Recession. For instance, in the five quarters that bracket the trough of the recession, 
2008Q4 to 2009Q4, the mean difference between the series is about 3 log points. 
However, this difference is short-lived. Since 2010, the two series have moved in tandem: 
employment has increased 11.6 log points, whereas flow-balance employment has 
increased 11.9 log points. 
                                      
19 Throughout our empirical analysis we use quadratic time trends, rather than an HP filter, as the latter 
is well known to suffer from end point problems, and the end of our sample is dominated by the recovery 
from the most recent recession. The aggregate time series, as well as the impulse responses we show later, 
are nonetheless qualitatively similar when an HP filter is applied to the data instead. 
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By contrast, recall from the theoretical results in section 1 that canonical models 
share the prediction that flow-balance employment jumps aggressively in response to 
aggregate shocks. Together these observations give a first suggestion that the 
propagation mechanism embodied in canonical models fails to capture the source of 
sluggishness in empirical employment dynamics. 
Time series matching. To contrast the data with the models’ predictions more 
precisely, we undertake a simulation exercise devised by King and Rebelo (1999) and 
Bachmann (2012). They show that it is possible to find a sequence of aggregate shocks 
that generates a path for aggregate model-generated outcomes—in our case 
employment—that matches an empirical analogue. In what follows, we use this 
technique to contrast the time series of flow-balance employment in model and data 
when the path of aggregate employment in each is constructed to be the same. 
The procedure relies on the ability to summarize the dynamics of aggregate 
employment implied by the model using a simple aggregate law of motion. In a related 
adjustment cost model, Bachmann shows that an AR(1) specification that relates log 
aggregate employment to its own lag and current labor productivity does an excellent 
job of summarizing these dynamics. We find that the same property holds for our 
model. 
Figures 2 through 5 suggest that linear cost models are especially capable of 
generating persistence in actual aggregate employment. We therefore initiate an 
algorithm with a variant of the (symmetric) linear cost model that is calibrated to 
replicate the amplitude and persistence of the empirical dynamics of actual 
employment.20 We find that a model with fixed wages and a linear cost that generates a 
quarterly inaction rate of 86 percent achieves this goal. Note that this procedure is being 
generous to the model by enabling it to match observed employment at the expense of 
violating the inaction rate and the flexibility of real wages observed in the data. 
Further, recalling Proposition 2, by suppressing movements in the real wage, we are 
dampening the volatility of flow-balance employment implied by the model. 
Accordingly, we shall see that we obtain a lower bound on the discrepancy between 
model and data. 
In a first step we use this model to generate 85 quarters of simulated data (the same 
time span as in the data). We then estimate via OLS the following AR(1) process that 
relates model-generated log aggregate employment to its lag and current aggregate 
productivity 𝑝𝑡, 
                                      
20 Specifically, we choose the flexibility of wages and the linear cost to minimize the (sum of squares) 
distance between the empirical dynamics of observed employment 𝑁 in Figure 10A and those implied by 
an equivalent specification run on model-generated data. We do not pursue the effects of asymmetries in 
adjustment costs here: the results of sections 1.3 and 1.4 suggest that any such asymmetries affect neither 
the dynamics of aggregate employment, nor its flow-balance counterpart. We do not use the search model, 
since its implications mirror those of the model we simulate (see Figures 3 to 5), but come at the expense 
of greater computational burden (due to the additional fixed-point problem over market tightness). 
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 ln 𝑁𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1 ln 𝑁𝑡−1 + ?̂?2 ln 𝑝𝑡. (23) 
With estimates of equation (23) in hand, we check whether the law of motion matches 
the empirical path of aggregate employment by substituting the latter time series into 
(23) and solving for the implied series of productivity. If the resultant sequence {𝑝𝑡} is 
consistent with the assumed data-generating process, we stop. Otherwise, in a second 
step, we re-parameterize the productivity process and re-initialize the model with this 
updated process. These steps are repeated until the moments of the productivity series 
implied by (23) are consistent with the parameterization assumed. In practice, the 
AR(1) specification in (23) fits the data closely (the R-squared of the regression is 
0.9985), and so the algorithm converges quite quickly, after just a few iterations.21 
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the results. To smooth out high frequency noise, we apply 
the above algorithm to match a four-quarter moving average of log aggregate 
employment in the data. The standard deviation of the resulting time series for actual 
employment ln 𝑁, shown in Figure 8, is 0.023. The model yields a notably more variable 
path for aggregate flow-balance employment, ?̂?. The model-implied standard deviation 
of ln ?̂? is 0.038, 36 percent larger than its empirical counterpart of 0.028.  
The deviations between model-implied and observed flow-balance employment are 
thrown into even starker relief in and around recessions, as shown in Figure 9. When 
the model-implied series is near its nadir, it lies 5-6 log points below its empirical 
counterpart. Aggregate flow-balance employment also recovers significantly more 
quickly in the wake of these downturns. In the eight quarters after the Great Recession, 
for instance, the model’s flow-balance employment rises 12 log points. Its empirical 
counterpart increases by half that amount over the same period. 
Measuring persistence. A final way of visualizing the difference between the data 
and the models’ predictions is to contrast the response of flow-balance employment to 
estimated shifts in the aggregate driving force. Rather than attempting to use the data 
to identify structural shocks, which is prone to controversy, we instead undertake a 
descriptive analysis of the dynamic properties of aggregate employment. A commonly 
used gauge for the latter is a comparison of the dynamics of employment relative to 
output-per-worker. In what follows, we interpret unforecastable movements in output-
per-worker as being indicative of innovations to the (latent) driving force, and estimate 
the reaction of flow-balance employment, in model and data, to these forecast errors. 
This serves as a simple way of summarizing the persistence of flow-balance employment. 
                                      
21 The implied process for output per worker in the model generated data shares roughly the same 
statistical properties as a similarly-smoothed output per worker series taken from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Productivity and Costs data. An estimated AR(1) through model-implied output per worker 
data gives a persistence parameter of about 0.94 and a standard deviation of residuals of about 0.004, 
comparable to estimates from the data.  
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Formally, we proceed as follows. Denote log output-per-worker by 𝑦𝑡 . In a first 
stage, we estimate innovations in 𝑦𝑡 that are unforecastable conditional on lags of 𝑦, 
and lags of log aggregate employment ln 𝑁 . Specifically, we use quarterly data on 
output-per-worker in the nonfarm business sector from the BLS Productivity and Costs 
release and our measure of actual employment from the QCEW to estimate the 
following AR(L) specification: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼
𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽𝑠
𝑦𝑦𝑡−𝑠
𝐿
𝑠=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑠
𝑦 ln 𝑁𝑡−𝑠
𝐿
𝑠=1
+ 𝛿1
𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2
𝑦𝑡2 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑦. (24) 
Within the context of the models considered in section 1, lags of output per worker 𝑦 
can be interpreted as proxies for lags of aggregate technology 𝑝, conditional on lags of 
𝑁, as in (24). More broadly, they can be viewed as proxies for past realizations of 
business cycle driving forces. Note that secular trends are captured using a quadratic 
time trend.  
The estimated residuals from this first-stage regression, 𝜀?̂?
𝑦
, are then used as the 
innovations to output-per-worker from which we derive impulse responses of actual and 
flow-balance employment in a second stage, 
 
ln 𝑁𝑡 = 𝛼
𝑁 + ∑ 𝛽𝑠
𝑁𝜀?̂?−𝑠
𝑦
𝐿−1
𝑠=0
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑠
𝑁 ln 𝑁𝑡−𝑠
𝐿
𝑠=1
+ 𝛿1
𝑁𝑡 + 𝛿2
𝑁𝑡2 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑁, and 
ln ?̂?𝑡 = 𝛼
?̂? + ∑ 𝛽𝑠
?̂?𝜀?̂?−𝑠
𝑦
𝐿−1
𝑠=0
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑠
?̂? ln ?̂?𝑡−𝑠
𝐿
𝑠=1
+ 𝛿1
?̂?𝑡 + 𝛿2
?̂?𝑡2 + 𝜀𝑡
?̂? . 
(25) 
Note that the timing in the lag structure of innovations to output-per-worker permits a 
contemporaneous relationship between these innovations and employment, as suggested 
by the model-based impulse responses described in section 1. 
The estimates from the regressions in equations (24) and (25) allow us to trace out 
the dynamic relationship between each measure of log aggregate employment and a one-
log-point innovation in output-per-worker. In practice, we use a lag order of 𝐿 = 4 in 
both stages, (24) and (25).22 Given the availability of our QCEW data, we estimate 
these regressions over the period, 1992Q2 to 2014Q2. 
Panel A of Figure 10 plots the results. The dynamic response of aggregate 
employment takes a familiar shape, rising slowly after the innovation with a peak 
response of around 1 log point after five quarters. These hump-shaped dynamics mirror 
similar results found using different methods elsewhere in the literature (Blanchard and 
Diamond 1989; Fujita and Ramey 2007; Hagedorn and Manovskii 2011). This is one 
representation of the persistence of aggregate employment. 
                                      
22 Experiments with different lag orders suggest that, although the peak of the hump-shaped impulse 
responses varies slightly across different lag lengths, Figure 10 is representative of results across these 
specifications. 
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As suggested by the time series in Figure 7, the dynamics of the flow-balance 
diagnostic ?̂? share many of these properties. Although its peak response occurs earlier—
after three quarters—reinforcing the impression of Figure 7 that ?̂? is a leading indicator 
of the path of 𝑁, it exhibits a similar volatility, and a clear hump-shape. 
To contrast the empirical dynamics illustrated in Figure 10A with those implied by 
canonical models of frictions, we rerun the regressions in equations (24) and (25) using 
model-generated data. Following our preceding discussion, we use the model with 
symmetric linear costs, chosen to minimize the distance between the empirical dynamics 
of actual employment 𝑁 in Figure 10A and those implied by the model.  
Panel B of Figure 10 reveals that this parameterization of the model is able to 
generate a dynamic relationship between actual employment and output-per-worker that 
is comparable to the data. Although the model overstates the impact response, the 
amplitude and persistence of employment are similar to their empirical counterparts. 
A key result of Figure 10B, however, is that the model-implied dynamics of flow-
balance employment are profoundly different from those seen in the data. Confirming 
the impression of the theoretical impulse responses in Figure 3, ?̂? jumps in response to 
innovations in output-per-worker in the model, with an initial response five times larger 
than that of actual employment 𝑁. In marked contrast, the empirical dynamics of ?̂? in 
Figure 10A are much more sluggish, bearing a closer resemblance to the empirical path 
of actual employment than its model-implied counterpart. 
The substantial discrepancy between the implied and observed dynamics of flow-
balance employment is an important failure of canonical models of frictions, in the sense 
that the models do not capture a key aspect of how shocks are propagated through the 
labor market.  
2.3 Understanding the failure of canonical models 
To examine the origins of this failure of canonical models, recall that the link between 
our diagnostic flow-balance employment ?̂? and frictionless employment 𝑁∗ is mediated 
through the behavior of firm size flows—the 𝜏s and 𝜙s of equations (4) and (13)—and 
that canonical frictions have strong predictions regarding the dynamics of these flows by 
establishment size. 
As we have emphasized, a key benefit of the data is that we can measure aspects of 
these flows using the longitudinal dimension of the QCEW microdata—specifically the 
total inflow to, and the probability of outflow from, each employment level. Our next 
exercise, therefore, is to contrast the dynamics of the firm size distribution in the data 
to those implied by canonical models of frictions. 
To do this, we first split establishments in the data into three size classes. We 
choose these to correspond to the lower quartile (fewer than 15 employees), interquartile 
range (16 to 170 employees), and upper quartile (171 employees and greater) of 
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establishment sizes. We then estimate descriptive impulse responses that mirror 
equations (24) and (25) for the total inflow to, and probability of outflow from, each 
size class.23 As in our previous analysis of the dynamics of aggregate employment, we 
repeat these same steps using data simulated from the model underlying Figure 10B 
that is calibrated to match as closely as possible the empirical dynamics of aggregate 
employment. 
Panels C through F of Figure 10 illustrate the results of this exercise. The empirical 
and model-implied dynamics share a qualitative property, namely that positive 
aggregate shocks render small (large) establishments more (less) likely to adjust away 
from their current employment, and induce fewer (more) establishments to adjust to low 
(high) employment levels. 
Aside from this broad qualitative similarity, the quantitative dynamics reveal 
striking contrasts. The empirical behavior of firm size flows exhibits an inertia not only 
in the sense that their levels are retarded relative to a frictionless environment, but also 
in the sluggishness of their responses to aggregate disturbances. 
We highlight three manifestations of this general observation. First, note that the 
empirical responses of the firm size flows in Figures 10C and 10E are an order of 
magnitude smaller than their theoretical counterparts in Figures 10D and 10F. Second, 
the dynamics of the flows in the data are much more sluggish than implied by canonical 
frictions. Firm size dynamics in the model respond aggressively on impact of the 
aggregate shock. In the data, the response is mild and delayed. Third, the empirical 
dynamics reveal an establishment size gradient in the magnitude of the response of firm 
size flows: Flows to and from smaller establishments respond less than their 
counterparts for larger establishments. 
The upshot of this exercise is that canonical models of labor market frictions do a 
poor job of capturing the empirical dynamics of the firm size distribution. Since the 
latter is the key channel through which canonical frictions are supposed to impede 
aggregate employment dynamics, this is an important limitation of this class of model. 
3. Summary and discussion 
In this paper, we have explored the propagation mechanism embodied in a canonical 
class of labor market frictions. In postulating several forms of non-convex adjustment 
frictions, this class has the virtue of being able to reproduce the conspicuous degree of 
inaction observed in establishment employment dynamics. We further show that (some 
of) these labor market frictions are in turn able to generate at least part of the observed 
sluggishness in aggregate employment dynamics.  
                                      
23 To aggregate within a quartile range, we take a weighted average across establishment sizes, where the 
weight is the size’s share of all establishments in the range.  
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However, canonical frictions have strong implications for the source of this 
propagation, for which we do not find empirical support. In this class of models, 
deviations of aggregate employment from its frictionless path arise because frictions 
retard the flow of labor across firms. But since the latter induces pent-up demand for 
adjustment, these firm size flows are predicted to respond rapidly to aggregate shocks. 
We use this to motivate a summary statistic for these flows, which we have labeled 
flow-balance employment, that can be measured with access to establishment panel 
data. 
We find that empirical measures of flow-balance employment display only mild 
departures from the path of actual employment, exhibit much more sluggish dynamics 
than implied by canonical frictions, and that the source of this tension can be traced to 
a failure of canonical models to capture the empirical persistence of firm size flows. 
We highlight two possible conclusions in the light of these findings. The first is that 
labor market frictions that induce inaction are indeed unimportant for aggregate 
employment dynamics. This suggests a return to an older literature on convex 
adjustment costs (as in, for example, Sargent 1978, and Shapiro 1986). The latter can 
induce sluggishness in firms’ choice of employment conditional on adjustment and may 
thus be able to attenuate the elasticity of the firm size flows. 
A drawback of such a conclusion, however, is that the presence of inaction is 
perhaps the most prominent stylized fact of microeconomic employment adjustment. In 
acknowledgement of this fact, a second, alternative conclusion is that future work 
should explore the possibility that such inaction might interact with other frictions to 
induce the observed sluggishness in firm-size flows. 
We provide one example of this possibility, based on an interaction of labor market 
and information frictions. Intuitively, if firms do not have full information on aggregate 
disturbances, they may attenuate their hiring and firing, dampening the response of 
flows of labor across firms. 
To illustrate, suppose aggregate productivity is the sum of transitory and 
permanent components. Firms observe aggregate productivity but not its constituent 
parts.24 In the absence of the labor market frictions, firms’ labor demand is the outcome 
of a simple static optimization problem, for which only knowledge of aggregate 
productivity is required. Thus, absent labor frictions, the information friction has no 
bite. 
In the presence of employment adjustment frictions, however, firms must forecast 
the path of the aggregate state, which requires a judgment of the degree to which an 
aggregate disturbance is permanent. Hiring and firing decisions are thus based on 
perceptions of the persistent component of productivity. Standard signal extraction 
arguments will imply that such perceptions are a slow-moving state variable. 
                                      
24 For early applications of this information structure in macroeconomics, see Brunner, Cukierman, and 
Meltzer (1980) and Gertler (1982). More recently, see Erceg and Levin (2003). 
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Accordingly, hiring and firing decisions respond less aggressively to aggregate shocks on 
impact. This can lead, qualitatively, to the drawn-out dynamics of the labor market 
flows we observe in the data. Critically, this persistence in hiring and firing policies will 
in turn contribute to persistent aggregate employment dynamics. 
The quantitative success of such a model will hinge on the rate at which firms 
update their assessment of the persistent component of aggregate productivity, and the 
extent to which such persistence can be reconciled with the large cyclical volatility of 
employment. Nonetheless, we suspect that an interaction of labor market frictions with 
a notion of imperfect information provides a promising avenue of further research that 
seeks to understand aggregate employment persistence.25 
References 
Abraham, Arpad and Kirk White. 2006. “The Dynamics of Plant-level Productivity in 
U.S. Manufacturing.” Center for Economic Studies WP 06-20.  
Acemoglu, Daron and William Hawkins. 2014. “Search with Multi-worker Firms.” 
Theoretical Economics 9(3): 583-628. 
Albrecht, James W., Bertil Holmlund, Harald Lang. 1991. “Comparative statics in 
dynamic programming models with an application to job search.” Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control 15(4): 755-769. 
Alvarez, Fernando, Francesco Lippi, and Luigi Paciello. 2011. “Optimal price setting 
with observation and menu costs.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(4): 1909-
1960. 
Bachmann, Ruediger. 2012. “Understanding Jobless Recoveries after 1991 and 2001.” 
Mimeo, University of Notre Dame.  
Bentolila, Samuel and Giuseppe Bertola. 1990. “Firing Costs and Labour Demand: How 
Bad is Eurosclerosis?” Review of Economic Studies 57(3): 381-402. 
Bertola, Giuseppe and Ricardo J. Caballero. 1990. “Kinked Adjustment Costs and 
Aggregate Dynamics.” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1990 Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Blanchard, Olivier Jean, and Peter Diamond. 1989. “The Beveridge Curve.” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 1: 1–60. 
Bloom, Nicholas. 2009. “The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks.” Econometrica 77(3): 623-
685. 
Bruegemann, Bjoern, Pieter Gautier and Guido Menzio. 2015. “Intra Firm Bargaining 
and Shapley Values.” Mimeo, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. 
                                      
25 Interestingly, though information frictions in macro have been revived in recent literature in monetary 
economics (see Mankiw and Reis’s 2011 survey), they have been used much more sparingly in 
understanding of labor dynamics. (For an exception, see Venkateswaran 2013.) 
 30 
Brunner, Karl, Alex Cukierman, and Allan Meltzer. 1980. “Stagflation, persistent 
unemployment, and the permanence of economic shocks.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 6: 467-492. 
Caballero, Ricardo and Eduardo M. R. A. Engel.  1993. “Microeconomic Adjustment 
Hazards and Aggregate Dynamics.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 433(2): 359-383. 
Caballero, Ricardo and Eduardo M. R. A. Engel. 1999. “Explaining Investment 
Dynamics in U.S. Manufacturing: A Generalized (S,s) Approach.” Econometrica 
67(4): 783-826. 
Caballero, Ricardo and Eduardo M. R. A. Engel. 2007. “Price Stickiness in Ss Models: 
New Interpretations of Old Results.” Journal of Monetary Economics 54(S1): 100-
121.  
Caballero, Ricardo, Eduardo M. R. A. Engel, and John Haltiwanger.  1995. “Plant Level 
Adjustment and Aggregate Investment Dynamics.” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 2: 1-54. 
Caballero, Ricardo, Eduardo M. R. A. Engel, and John Haltiwanger. 1997. “Aggregate 
Employment Dynamics: Building from Microeconomics.” American Economic 
Review, 87(1) 115-137. 
Chetty, Raj. 2012. “Bounds on Elasticities with Optimization Frictions: A Synthesis of 
Micro and Macro Evidence on Labor Supply.” Econometrica 80(3): 969-1018. 
Chetty, Raj, Adam Guren, Day Manoli, and Andrea Weber. 2012. “Does Indivisible 
Labor Explain the Difference between Micro and Macro Elasticities? A Meta-Analysis 
of Extensive Margin Elasticities.” In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2012, edited by 
D. Acemoglu, J. Parker, and M. Woodford, University of Chicago Press, 1-56. 
Christiano, Lawrence, and Richard Todd. 1996. “Time to plan and aggregate 
fluctuations.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review Winter: 14-27. 
Cooper, Russell, John Haltiwanger, Jonathan L. Willis. 2007. “Search frictions: 
Matching aggregate and establishment observations.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 54(1): 56-78. 
Cooper, Russell, John Haltiwanger, Jonathan L. Willis. 2015. “Dynamics of labor 
demand: Evidence from plant-level observations and aggregate implications.” 
Research in Economics 6(1): 37-50. 
Davis, Steven J., and John Haltiwanger. 1992. “Gross Job Creation, Gross Job 
Destruction, and Employment Reallocation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(3): 
819-864. 
Elsby, Michael W. L. and Ryan Michaels. 2013. “Marginal Jobs, Heterogeneous Firms, 
and Unemployment Flows.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5(1): 1-
48. 
Elsby, Michael W. L. and Ryan Michaels. 2014. “Fixed Adjustment Costs and 
Aggregate Fluctuations.” Mimeo, University of Edinburgh. 
 31 
Elsby, Michael W. L., Donggyun Shin and Gary Solon. 2016. “Wage Adjustment in the 
Great Recession and other Downturns: Evidence from the United States and Great 
Britain.” Journal of Labor Economics 34 (S1): S249-S291. 
Erceg, Christopher and Andrew Levin. 2003. “Imperfect credibility and inflation 
persistence.” Journal of Monetary Economics 90: 915-944. 
Fuhrer, Jeff and George Moore. 1995. “Inflation Persistence.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 110(1): 127-159. 
Fujita, Shigeru, and Garey Ramey. 2007. “Job Matching and Propagation.” Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control 31 (11): 3671–98. 
Gertler, Mark. 1982. “Imperfect information and wage inertia in the business cycle.” 
Journal of Political Economy 90(5): 967-987. 
Gertler, Mark and John Leahy. 2008. “A Phillips Curve with an Ss Foundation.” 
Journal of Political Economy 116(3): 533-572. 
Golosov, Mikhail and Robert E. Lucas. 2007. “Menu Costs and Phillips Curves.” 
Journal of Political Economy 115(2): 171-199. 
Gorodnichenko, Yuriy. 2010. “Endogenous information, menu costs and inflation 
persistence.” Mimeo, University of California, Berkeley. 
Hagedorn, Marcus, and Iourii Manovskii. 2011. “Productivity and the Labor Market: 
Comovement over the Business Cycle.” International Economic Review 52 (3): 603–
19. 
Hamermesh, Daniel. 1989. “Labor Demand and the Structure of Adjustment Costs.” 
American Economic Review 79(4): 674-689. 
Hopenhayn, Hugo and Richard Rogerson. 1993. “Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: 
A General Equilibrium Analysis.” Journal of Political Economy 101(5): 915-938. 
Kimball, Miles and Matthew Shapiro. 2010. “Labor Supply: Are Income and 
Substitution Effects Both Large or Both Small?” Mimeo, University of Michigan. 
King, Robert and Sergio Rebelo. 1999. “Resuscitating Real Business Cycles.” Handbook 
of Macroeconomics, Volume 1, chapter 14: 927-1007. 
King, Robert and Julia Thomas. 2006. “Partial Adjustment Without Apology.” 
International Economic Review 47(3): 779-809. 
Krusell, Per, and Anthony Smith. 1998. “Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the 
Macroeconomy.”Journal of Political Economy 106(5): 867-896. 
Mankiw, Gregory, and Ricardo Reis. 2002. “Sticky information v. sticky prices: A 
proposal to replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 117(4): 1295-1328. 
Mankiw, Gregory and Ricardo Reis. 2011. “Imperfect information and aggregate 
supply.” Handbook of Monetary Economics. 
Mortensen, Dale T. and Eva Nagypal. 2007. “More on Unemployment and Vacancy 
Fluctuations.” Review of Economic Dynamics 10(3): 327-347. 
 32 
Mortensen, Dale T., and Christopher A. Pissarides. 1994. “Job Creation and Job 
Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment.” Review of Economic Studies 61(3): 
397–415. 
Moscarini, Giuseppe, and Fabien Postel-Vinay. 2016. “Wage Posting and Business 
Cycles: a Quantitative Exploration.” Review of Economic Dynamics 19: 135-160. 
Nickell, Stephen. 1978. “Fixed Costs, Employment and Labour Demand Over the 
Cycle.” Economica 45(180): 329-345. 
Nickell, Stephen. 1986. “Dynamic Models of Labour Demand,” Chapter 8, in 
Ashenfelter, O. and Layard, R. (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, North Holland. 
Oi, Walter Y. 1962. “Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor.” Journal of Political Economy 
70(6), 538-555. 
Petrongolo, Barbara, and Christopher A. Pissarides. 2001. “Looking into the Black Box: 
A Survey of the Matching Function.” Journal of Economic Literature 39(2): 390–431. 
Pissarides, Christopher A. 1985. “Short-Run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment, 
Vacancies, and Real Wages.” American Economic Review 75(4): 676–90. 
Pissarides, Christopher A. 2009. “The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage 
Stickiness the Answer?” Econometrica 77: 1339-1369. 
Sargent, Thomas J. 1978. “Estimation of Dynamic Labor Demand Schedules under 
Rational Expectations.” Journal of Political Economy 86(6): 1009–1044. 
Shapiro, Matthew D. 1986. “The Dynamic Demand for Capital and Labor.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 101(3): 513-542. 
Solon, Gary, Robert Barsky, and Jonathan Parker. 1994. “Measuring the Cyclicality of 
Real Wages: How Important is Composition Bias?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
109(1): 1-25. 
Stole, Lars A., and Jeffrey Zwiebel. 1996. “Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding 
Contracts.” Review of Economic Studies 63(3), 375-410. 
Venkateswaran, Venky. 2013. “Heterogeneous information and labor market 
fluctuations.” Mimeo. 
Veracierto, Marcelo. 2002. “Plant-level irreversible investment and equilibrium business 
cycles.” American Economic Review 92(1): 181-197. 
Veracierto, Marcelo. 2008. “Firing Costs and Business Cycle Fluctuations.” 
International Economic Review 49(1): 1-39. 
 33 
Figure 1. Ss policies in the presence of fixed, linear, and search adjustment frictions 
A. Fixed costs B. Linear costs 
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Figure 2. Impulse responses of aggregate employment: Fixed costs 
A. Quarterly inaction rate 52.5% B. Quarterly inaction rate 67% C. Quarterly inaction rate 80% 
   
 
Figure 3. Impulse responses of aggregate employment: Linear costs 
A. Quarterly inaction rate 52.5% B. Quarterly inaction rate 67% C. Quarterly inaction rate 80% 
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Figure 4. Impulse responses of aggregate employment: Asymmetric linear costs 
A. Quarterly inaction rate 52.5% B. Quarterly inaction rate 67% C. Quarterly inaction rate 80% 
   
i. Pure hiring cost   
   
   
ii. Pure firing cost   
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Figure 5. Impulse responses of aggregate employment: Search costs 
A. Quarterly inaction rate 52.5% B. Quarterly inaction rate 67% C. Quarterly inaction rate 80% 
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Figure 6. Aggregate employment in the QCEW by sample restriction 
       
 
Figure 7. Actual and flow-balance log aggregate employment 
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Figure 8. Model-implied flow-balance log aggregate employment: Time series 
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Figure 9. Model-implied flow-balance log aggregate employment: Recession and recovery episodes 
A. 2000+ Recession B. 2006+ Recession 
  
  
C. 2003+ Recovery D. 2009+ Recovery 
  
 
Notes:  Each series is plotted relative to its own cyclical peak (panels A and B) or trough (C and D) since the timing of 
the cycle can differ across series (although in practice they only differ by at most two quarters).  
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Figure 10. Descriptive impulse responses of employment and firm size flows: Data versus model 
A. Employment: Data B. Employment: Model 
  
  
C. Outflow probability: Data D. Outflow probability: Model 
  
  
E. Total inflow: Data F. Total inflow: Model 
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Appendix 
A. Laws of motion for the firm size distribution 
To derive the laws of motion in equations (2) and (11) in the main text, we require 
notation for several distributions. As in the main text, we denote the densities of 
employment, lagged employment and frictionless employment by ℎ, ℎ−1 and ℎ
∗, and will 
refer to their respective distribution functions by analogous upper-case letters, 𝐻, 𝐻−1 
and 𝐻∗. In addition, however, we require notation for the distributions of frictionless 
employment conditional on lagged employment, which we denote by ℋ∗(𝜉|𝜈) =
Pr(𝑛∗ < 𝜉|𝑛−1 = 𝜈) , and the distribution of lagged employment conditional on 
frictionless employment, denoted by ℋ(𝜈|𝜉) = Pr(𝑛−1 < 𝜈|𝑛
∗ = 𝜉). The latter are related 
by Bayes’ rule, 𝒽(𝜈|𝜉)ℎ∗(𝜉) = 𝒽∗(𝜉|𝜈)ℎ−1(𝜈) , where lower-case script letters denote 
associated density functions. But we preserve separate notation to aid clarity. 
We can now use the labor demand policy rules—(1) for the fixed costs case, (10) for 
the linear costs case—to construct laws of motion for the distribution function of actual 
employment 𝐻(𝑛) implied by each type of friction. We then show how these imply the 
laws of motion for the density ℎ(𝑛) stated in equations (2) and (11) in the main text. 
Fixed costs. Consider a point 𝑚 in the domain of the employment distribution. We 
wish to derive the flows in and out of 𝐻(𝑚). To do so, we first derive flows for a given 
lagged employment level 𝑛−1. Then inflows into 𝐻(𝑚) are summarized as follows:  
1) If 𝑚 < 𝐿(𝑛−1) , or equivalently 𝑛−1 > 𝐿
−1(𝑚) , then the inflow is equal to 
ℋ∗(𝑚|𝑛−1).  
2) If 𝑚 ∈ [𝐿(𝑛−1), 𝑛−1), or equivalently 𝑛−1 ∈ (𝑚, 𝐿
−1(𝑚)], then the inflow is equal 
to ℋ∗(𝐿(𝑛−1)|𝑛−1). 
Likewise, the outflows from 𝐻(𝑚) for a given 𝑛−1 can be evaluated as: 
3) If 𝑚 ∈ (𝑛−1, 𝑈(𝑛−1)] , or equivalently 𝑛−1 ∈ [𝑈
−1(𝑚), 𝑚) , then the outflow is 
equal to 1 − ℋ∗(𝑈(𝑛−1)|𝑛−1). 
4) If 𝑚 > 𝑈(𝑛−1), or equivalently 𝑛−1 < 𝑈
−1(𝑚), then the outflows is equal to 1 −
ℋ∗(𝑚|𝑛−1). 
Integrating the latter with respect to the distribution of lagged employment 
𝐻−1(𝑛−1) recovers the aggregate flows and thereby the law of motion for 𝐻(𝑚), 
 
𝛥𝐻(𝑚) = ∫ ℋ∗(𝑚|𝑛−1)𝑑𝐻−1(𝑛−1)
𝐿−1(𝑚)
+ ∫ ℋ∗(𝐿(𝑛−1)|𝑛−1)𝑑𝐻−1(𝑛−1)
𝐿−1(𝑚)
𝑚
− ∫ [1 − ℋ∗(𝑈(𝑛−1)|𝑛−1)]𝑑𝐻−1(𝑛−1)
𝑚
𝑈−1(𝑚)
− ∫ [1 − ℋ∗(𝑚|𝑛−1)]𝑑𝐻−1(𝑛−1)
𝑈−1(𝑚)
. 
(26) 
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Linear costs. Likewise, one can use the adjustment rule for the linear costs case, (10), 
to construct an analogous law of motion under linear costs. Again, we first fix a given 
level of lagged employment, 𝑛−1, and evaluate inflows to, and outflows from, 𝐻(𝑚). 
These flows are simpler in the linear costs case. Inflows are given by: 
1) If 𝑚 < 𝑛−1, or equivalently 𝑛−1 > 𝑚, then the inflow is equal to ℋ
∗(𝑙(𝑚)|𝑛−1). 
Similarly, outflows are given by: 
2) If 𝑚 > 𝑛−1 , or equivalently 𝑛−1 < 𝑚 , then the outflow is equal to 1 −
ℋ∗(𝑢(𝑚)|𝑛−1). 
Following the same logic as above, the law of motion for 𝐻(𝑚) is thus given by 
 𝛥𝐻(𝑚) = ∫ ℋ∗(𝑙(𝑚)|𝑛−1)𝑑𝐻−1(𝑛−1)
𝑚
− ∫ [1 − ℋ∗(𝑢(𝑚)|𝑛−1)]𝑑𝐻−1(𝑛−1)
𝑚
. (27) 
Laws of motion for ℎ(𝑛). Differentiating (26) and (27) with respect to 𝑚, cancelling 
terms, and using Bayes’ rule to note that ∫ 𝒽∗(𝜉|𝑛−1)ℎ−1(𝑛−1)𝑑𝑛−1
𝜈
0
=
∫ 𝒽(𝑛−1|𝜉)ℎ
∗(𝜉)𝑑𝑛−1
𝜈
0
 yields the simpler laws of motion for the density of employment 
ℎ(𝑛), equations (2) and (11) in the main text. 
B. Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 
To establish Propositions 1 and 2 in the main text, it is convenient first to define a 
notion of quasi-frictionless employment, defined as the employment level implied by 
frictionless labor demand, evaluated at the frictional wage, 𝑤. Lemma 1 shows that the 
firm’s problem can be normalized with respect to quasi-frictionless employment to 
establish some useful homogeneity properties. Using this homogeneous problem, we can 
relate the change in aggregate log flow steady-state employment Δ?̂? to the change in 
aggregate log quasi-frictionless employment. In a final step, we link the latter to the 
change in aggregate log frictionless employment. 
Definition (i) Quasi-frictionless employment 𝑛⋆ solves 𝑝𝑥𝛼𝑛⋆
𝛼−1
≡ 𝑤, where 𝑤 is the 
frictional equilibrium wage; and (ii) frictionless employment 𝑛∗ solves 𝑝𝑥𝛼𝑛∗𝛼−1 ≡ 𝑤∗ , 
where 𝑤∗ is the frictionless equilibrium wage. 
Remark The change in aggregate log quasi-frictionless employment 𝛥𝒩⋆ induced by a 
change in aggregate productivity 𝛥 ln 𝑝  is related to the change in aggregate log 
frictionless employment 𝛥𝒩∗ according to 
 𝛥𝒩⋆ =
1 − 𝜖𝑤
1 − 𝜖𝑤∗
𝛥𝒩∗, (28) 
where 𝜖𝑤  and 𝜖𝑤∗  denote the elasticities of the equilibrium wage to aggregate 
productivity 𝑝, respectively with and without frictions. 
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Lemma 1 (Caballero and Engel 1999) Consider the firm’s problem, 
 
𝛱(𝑛−1, 𝑥) ≡ max
𝑛
{𝑝𝑥𝑛𝛼 − 𝑤𝑛 − 𝐶+𝕀[𝑛 > 𝑛−1] − 𝐶
−𝕀[𝑛 < 𝑛−1] − 𝑐
+𝛥𝑛+ + 𝑐−𝛥𝑛− 
+𝛽𝔼[𝛱(𝑛, 𝑥′)|𝑥]}. 
(29) 
If (i) ln 𝑥′ = ln 𝑥 + 𝜀𝑥
′  with 𝜀𝑥
′  i.i.d., and (ii) 𝐶−/+ = Γ−/+𝑤𝑛⋆  and 𝑐−/+ = 𝛾−/+𝑤 , then 
(a) the adjustment policy takes the form 
 𝑛 = {
𝑛⋆/𝑢 if 𝑛⋆ > 𝑈 ⋅ 𝑛−1,
𝑛−1 if 𝑛
⋆ ∈ [𝐿 ⋅ 𝑛−1, 𝑈 ⋅ 𝑛−1],
𝑛⋆/𝑙 if 𝑛⋆ < 𝐿 ⋅ 𝑛−1.
 (30) 
for constants 𝐿 ≤ 𝑙 < 1 < 𝑢 ≤ 𝑈 ; and (b) desired (log) employment adjustments, 
ln(𝑛⋆/𝑛−1), are independent of initial firm size 𝑛−1. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Since idiosyncratic shocks follow a geometric random walk, ln 𝑥′ =
ln 𝑥 + 𝜀𝑥
′ , so does (quasi-) frictionless employment, ln 𝑛⋆
′
= ln 𝑛⋆ + 𝜀𝑛⋆
′  where 𝜀𝑛⋆
′ =
𝜀𝑥
′ /(1 − 𝛼). Defining 𝑧 = 𝑛/𝑛⋆  and 𝜁 = 𝑛−1/𝑛
⋆ , a conjecture that 𝛱(𝑛−1, 𝑥) = 𝑤𝑛
⋆Π̃(𝜁) 
implies 
 
𝛱(𝜁) = max
𝑧
{
𝑧𝛼
𝛼
− 𝑧 − 𝛤+𝕀[𝑧 > 𝜁] − 𝛤−𝕀[𝑧 < 𝜁] − 𝛾+(𝑧 − 𝜁)+ + 𝛾−(𝑧 − 𝜁)− 
+𝛽𝔼 [𝑒𝜀𝑛⋆
′
𝛱 (𝑒−𝜀𝑛⋆
′
𝑧)]}. 
(31) 
We highlight two aspects of (31). First, the expectation over the forward value is no 
longer conditional, since it is taken over 𝜀𝑛⋆
′ , which is i.i.d. Second, the firm’s problem is 
simplified to the choice of a number 𝑧 = 𝑛/𝑛⋆ for each realization of the single state 
variable 𝜁 = 𝑛−1/𝑛
⋆. 
An Ss policy will thus stipulate that 𝑧 = 𝜁 for intermediate values of 𝜁 ∈ [1/𝑈, 1/𝐿], 
and will set 𝑧 = 1/𝑢 whenever 𝜁 < 1/𝑈, and 𝑧 = 1/𝑙 whenever 𝜁 > 1/𝐿. Mapping back 
into employment terms implies the adjustment policy in (30), establishing part a) of the 
result. Note that the case of pure fixed costs implies 𝑢 = 𝑙, while pure linear costs imply 
𝑙 = 𝐿 < 𝑈 = 𝑢. 
To establish part b), note that the probability of a desired log employment 
adjustment of size less than 𝛿 can be written, in general, as 
 Pr(ln(𝑛⋆
′
/𝑛) < 𝛿|𝑛) = Pr(𝜀𝑛⋆
′ < 𝛿 + ln 𝑧 |𝑛) = ∫ Pr(𝜀𝑛⋆
′ < 𝛿 + ln 𝑧 |𝑛, 𝑧) 𝑑𝛧(𝑧|𝑛), (32) 
where 𝛧(𝑧|𝑛)  denotes the distribution function of 𝑧  given 𝑛 . In the context of the 
canonical model, however, (32) simplifies. First, 𝜀𝑛⋆
′  is independent of 𝑛 since the former 
is i.i.d. Second, 𝑧 is also independent of 𝑛. To see this, note first that if a firm adjusts 
this period, its choice of 𝑧 is uninformed by 𝑛—it sets 𝑧 = 1/𝑢 or 𝑧 = 1/𝑙. If the firm 
sets 𝑛 = 𝑛−1 but adjusted last period, then it sets ln 𝑧 = ln 𝑛−1 − ln 𝑛
⋆ = ln 𝑧−1 − 𝜀𝑛⋆ and 
𝑧−1 is 1/𝑢 or 1/𝑙. Thus, 𝑧 is again independent of 𝑛. More generally, suppose the firm 
last adjusted 𝑇  periods ago, that is, 𝑛 = 𝑛−1 = ⋯ = 𝑛−𝑇  and 𝑧−𝑇 = 1/𝑢  or 1/𝑙 . Then, 
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ln 𝑧 = ln 𝑛−𝑇 − ln 𝑛
⋆ = ln 𝑧−𝑇 − ∑ 𝜀𝑛−𝑡⋆
𝑇−1
𝑡=0 . Each term here is independent of 𝑛 = 𝑛−𝑇 . 
Equation (32) therefore collapses to 
 Pr(ln(𝑛⋆
′
/𝑛) < 𝛿|𝑛) = ∫ Pr(𝜀𝑛⋆
′ < 𝛿 + ln 𝑧 |𝑧) 𝑑𝛧(𝑧), (33) 
which does not depend on 𝑛. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Denoting log employment by 𝓃, the adjustment rules take 
the form 𝐿(𝓃) = 𝓃 − 𝜆  and 𝑈(𝓃) = 𝓃 + 𝜐  for 𝜆 > 0  and 𝜐 > 0 . The density of log 
employment in flow balance is then defined by 
 ℎ̂(𝓃) ≡
1 − ℋ(𝓃 + 𝜆|𝓃) + ℋ(𝓃 − 𝜐|𝓃)
1 − ℋ⋆(𝓃 + 𝜐|𝓃) + ℋ⋆(𝓃 − 𝜆|𝓃)
ℎ⋆(𝓃), (34) 
where ℋ⋆(𝜉|𝜈) ≡ Pr(𝓃⋆ < 𝜉|𝓃−1 = 𝜈) and ℋ(𝜈|𝜉) ≡ Pr(𝓃−1 < 𝜈|𝓃
⋆ = 𝜉). The property 
of the canonical model noted in result b) of Lemma 1, that 𝓃⋆ − 𝓃−1 is independent of 
𝓃−1, implies that 
 ℋ⋆(𝜉|𝜈) = Pr(𝓃⋆ − 𝓃−1 < 𝜉 − 𝜈) ≡ ℋ̃
⋆(𝜉 − 𝜈). (35) 
This implies that the probability of adjusting away from 𝓃 is independent of 𝓃,  
 1 − ℋ⋆(𝓃 + 𝜐|𝓃) + ℋ⋆(𝓃 − 𝜆|𝓃) = 1 − ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜐
−𝜆
≡ 𝜙. (36) 
Now consider the probability of adjusting to 𝓃. Using Bayes’ rule, equation (35), and a 
change of variable, we can write this as 
 
1 − ℋ(𝓃 + 𝜆|𝓃) + ℋ(𝓃 − 𝜐|𝓃) = 1 − ∫ 𝒽⋆(𝓃|𝜈)
ℎ−1(𝜈)
ℎ⋆(𝓃)
𝑑𝜈
𝓃+𝜆
𝓃−𝜐
 
= 1 − ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝓃 − 𝜈)
ℎ−1(𝜈)
ℎ⋆(𝓃)
𝑑𝜈
𝓃+𝜆
𝓃−𝜐
 
= 1 − ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)
ℎ−1(𝓃 − 𝑧)
ℎ⋆(𝓃)
𝑑𝑧
𝜐
−𝜆
. 
(37) 
Piecing this together, we have 
 ℎ̂(𝓃) =
ℎ⋆(𝓃) − ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)ℎ−1(𝓃 − 𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜐
−𝜆
1 − ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜐
−𝜆
. (38) 
Multiplying both sides by 𝓃, using (36), and integrating yields 
 
?̂? ≡ ∫ 𝓃ℎ̂(𝓃)𝑑𝓃
∞
−∞
=
𝒩⋆
𝜙
−
1
𝜙
∫ ∫ 𝓃?̃?⋆(𝑧)ℎ−1(𝓃 − 𝑧)𝑑𝑧𝑑𝓃
𝜐
−𝜆
∞
−∞
 
=
𝒩⋆
𝜙
−
1 − 𝜙
𝜙
𝒩−1 −
1
𝜙
∫ 𝑧?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜐
−𝜆
. 
(39) 
Since there is a constant- 𝒩⋆  state prior to the aggregate shock, aggregate log 
employment is constant and equal to aggregate flow-balance employment, 𝒩−1 = 𝒩−2 =
?̂?−1. Imposing this and solving for ?̂?−1 yields 
 ?̂?−1 = 𝒩−1
⋆ − ∫ 𝑧?̃?−1
⋆ (𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜐
−𝜆
. (40) 
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Now consider a shock to aggregate log (quasi-) frictionless employment, 𝛥𝒩⋆ . On 
impact this will shift the mean of the distribution of desired employment adjustments, 
?̃?⋆(⋅), by 𝛥𝒩⋆. Given the prior constant-𝒩⋆ state, substitution of (40) into (39) implies 
 𝛥?̂? =
𝛥𝒩⋆
𝜙
−
1
𝜙
∫ 𝑧𝛥?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜐
−𝜆
. (41) 
Noting that 𝛥?̃?⋆(𝑧) = ?̃?−1
⋆ (𝑧 − 𝛥𝒩⋆) − ?̃?−1
⋆ (𝑧) , a first-order approximation around 
𝛥𝒩⋆ = 0 yields 
 𝛥?̂? ≈ (1 + 𝜓) ⋅ 𝛥𝒩⋆, where 𝜓 ≡
𝜐?̃?−1
⋆ (𝜐) + 𝜆?̃?−1
⋆ (−𝜆)
𝜙−1
. (42) 
The latter, combined with equation (28), implies the stated result. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof mirrors the proof of Proposition 1 above. The 
adjustment rules again take the form 𝑙(𝓃) = 𝓃 − 𝜆 and 𝑢(𝓃) = 𝓃 + 𝜐 for 𝜆 > 0 and 𝜐 >
0. The density of log employment in flow balance is then defined by 
 ℎ̂(𝓃) ≡
[1 − ℋ(𝓃|𝓃 − 𝜆)]ℎ⋆(𝓃 − 𝜆) + ℋ(𝓃|𝓃 + 𝜐)ℎ⋆(𝓃 + 𝜐)
1 − ℋ⋆(𝓃 + 𝜐|𝓃) + ℋ⋆(𝓃 − 𝜆|𝓃)
. (43) 
Since ℋ⋆(𝜉|𝜈) = Pr(𝓃⋆ − 𝓃−1 < 𝜉 − 𝜈) ≡ ℋ̃
⋆(𝜉 − 𝜈), the probability of adjusting away 
from 𝓃 is again independent of 𝓃,  
 1 − ℋ⋆(𝓃 + 𝜐|𝓃) + ℋ⋆(𝓃 − 𝜆|𝓃) = 1 − ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜐
−𝜆
≡ 𝜙. (44) 
Now use Bayes’ rule to write the probabilities of adjusting down and up to 𝓃 as 
 
1 − ℋ(𝓃|𝓃 − 𝜆) = ∫ 𝒽⋆(𝓃 − 𝜆|𝓃)
ℎ−1(𝜈)
ℎ⋆(𝓃 − 𝜆)
𝑑𝜈
∞
𝓃
 
= ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝓃 − 𝜆 − 𝜈)
ℎ−1(𝜈)
ℎ⋆(𝓃 − 𝜆)
𝑑𝜈
∞
𝓃
 
= ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)
ℎ−1(𝓃 − 𝜆 − 𝑧)
ℎ⋆(𝓃 − 𝜆)
𝑑𝑧
−𝜆
−∞
, 
(45) 
and, using an analogous method, 
 ℋ(𝓃|𝓃 + 𝜐) = ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)
ℎ−1(𝓃 + 𝜐 − 𝑧)
ℎ⋆(𝓃 + 𝜐)
𝑑𝑧
∞
𝜐
. (46) 
Piecing this together, we have 
 ℎ̂(𝓃) =
∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)ℎ−1(𝓃 − 𝜆 − 𝑧)𝑑𝑧
−𝜆
−∞
+ ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)ℎ−1(𝓃 + 𝜐 − 𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∞
𝜐
1 − ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜐
−𝜆
. (47) 
Multiplying both sides by 𝓃 and integrating yields 
 
?̂? =
1
𝜙
∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧) ∫ 𝓃ℎ−1(𝓃 − 𝜆 − 𝑧)𝑑𝑛
∞
−∞
𝑑𝑧
−𝜆
−∞
+
1
𝜙
∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧) ∫ 𝓃ℎ−1(𝓃 + 𝜐 − 𝑧)𝑑𝑛
∞
−∞
𝑑𝑧
∞
𝜐
 
=
𝒩∗
𝜙
−
1 − 𝜙
𝜙
𝒩−1 +
1
𝜙
[𝜆 ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
−𝜆
−∞
− 𝜐 ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∞
𝜐
] −
1
𝜙
∫ 𝑧?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜐
−𝜆
, 
(48) 
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where we have used the fact that ∫ 𝑧?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∞
−∞
= 𝒩⋆ − 𝒩−1. Solving for ?̂?−1 = 𝒩−1 =
𝒩−2 in the prior constant-𝒩
⋆ state yields 
 ?̂?−1 = 𝒩−1
⋆ + 𝜆 ∫ ?̃?−1
⋆ (𝑧)𝑑𝑧
−𝜆
−∞
− 𝜐 ∫ ?̃?−1
⋆ (𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∞
𝜐
− ∫ 𝑧?̃?−1
⋆ (𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜐
−𝜆
. (49) 
Substitution of (49) into (48) implies that a shock to aggregate log (quasi-) frictionless 
employment that shifts the mean of ?̃?⋆(⋅) by 𝛥𝒩⋆ will induce a change in ?̂? relative to 
the prior constant-𝒩⋆ state equal to 
 𝛥?̂? =
𝛥𝒩⋆
𝜙
+
1
𝜙
[𝜆 ∫ 𝛥?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
−𝜆
−∞
− 𝜐 ∫ 𝛥?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∞
𝜐
] −
1
𝜙
∫ 𝑧𝛥?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜐
−𝜆
. (50) 
Noting that 𝛥?̃?⋆(𝑧) = ?̃?−1
⋆ (𝑧 − 𝛥𝒩⋆) − ?̃?−1
⋆ (𝑧) , a first-order approximation around 
𝛥𝒩⋆ = 0 yields 
 𝛥?̂? ≈ 𝛥𝒩⋆. (51) 
Combining with equation (28), yields the stated result. 
C. Large-firm canonical search and matching model 
In this appendix, we describe in more detail the theoretical results and the quantitative 
numerical model presented in section 1.5. 
Theoretical results. The firm’s problem for this model combines equations (16) and 
(17) in the main text to obtain: 
 
𝛱(𝑛−1, 𝑥) ≡ max
𝑛
{𝐴𝑝𝑥𝑛𝛼 − (1 − 𝜂)𝜔𝑛 −
𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
𝛥𝑛+ + 𝛽𝔼[𝛱(𝑛, 𝑥′)|𝑥]} , 
where 𝐴 ≡
1 − 𝜂
1 − 𝜂(1 − 𝛼)
. 
(52) 
To establish Proposition 3 in the main text, we proceed as above. 
Definition (i) Quasi-frictionless employment 𝑛⋆ solves 𝐴𝑝𝑥𝛼𝑛⋆
𝛼−1
≡ (1 − 𝜂)𝜔, where 𝜔 
is the worker’s outside option; and (ii) frictionless employment 𝑛∗ solves 𝑝𝑥𝛼𝑛∗𝛼−1 ≡
𝑤∗, where 𝑤∗ is the frictionless equilibrium wage. 
Remark The change in aggregate log quasi-frictionless employment 𝛥𝒩⋆ induced by a 
change in aggregate productivity 𝛥 ln 𝑝  is related to the change in aggregate log 
frictionless employment 𝛥𝒩∗ according to 
 𝛥𝒩⋆ =
1 − 𝜖𝜔
1 − 𝜖𝑤∗
𝛥𝒩∗, (53) 
where 𝜖𝜔  and 𝜖𝑤∗  respectively denote the elasticities of the worker’s outside option 𝜔 
and the frictionless wage 𝑤∗ to aggregate productivity 𝑝. 
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Lemma 1 ′ If (i) ln 𝑥′ = ln 𝑥 + 𝜀𝑥
′  with 𝜀𝑥
′  i.i.d., and (ii) 𝑐 = 𝛾(1 − 𝜂)𝜔 , then (a) the 
adjustment triggers take the form in (10), are linear, 𝑙(𝑛) = 𝑙 ⋅ 𝑛 and 𝑢(𝑛) = 𝑢 ⋅ 𝑛 for 
time-varying 𝑙 < 1 < 𝑢; and (b) desired (log) employment adjustments, ln(𝑛⋆/𝑛−1), are 
independent of initial firm size 𝑛−1. 
Proof. Note that a conjecture that 𝛱(𝑛−1, 𝑥) = (1 − 𝜂)𝜔𝑛
⋆𝛱(𝜁) yields 
 𝛱(𝜁) ≡ max
𝑧
{
𝑧𝛼
𝛼
− 𝑧 −
𝛾
𝑞(𝜃)
(𝑧 − 𝜁)+ + 𝛽𝔼 [𝑒𝜀𝑛⋆
′
𝛱 (𝑒−𝜀𝑛⋆
′
𝑧)]}. (54) 
Results (a) and (b) follow from the proof to Lemma 1 above.  
Lemma 2 If (i) the adjustment triggers are symmetric, − ln 𝑙 = ln 𝑢 ≡ 𝜇, and (ii) the 
distribution of innovations 𝜀𝑛⋆ is symmetric, ℰ(−𝜀𝑛⋆) = 1 − ℰ(𝜀𝑛⋆), then the distribution 
of desired (log) employment adjustments ln(𝑛⋆/𝑛−1) is symmetric, ℋ̃
⋆(−𝜍) = 1 − ℋ̃⋆(𝜍). 
Proof. Note first that the distribution of the desired log change in employment, 𝓃⋆ −
𝓃−1 , conditional on last period’s log gap, 𝓏−1 = 𝓃−1 − 𝓃−1
⋆ , takes the simple form 
Pr(𝓃⋆ − 𝓃−1 < 𝜍|𝓏−1) = ℰ(𝜍 − 𝓏−1) , since 𝜀𝑛⋆ ≡ 𝓃
⋆ − 𝓃−1
⋆  is i.i.d. with distribution 
function ℰ(⋅). It follows that the unconditional distribution of 𝓃⋆ − 𝓃−1 is 
 ℋ̃⋆(𝜍) = ∫ Pr(𝓃⋆ − 𝓃−1 < 𝜍|𝓏−1) ℊ(𝓏−1)d𝓏−1
𝜇
−𝜇
= ∫ ℰ(𝜍 − 𝓏−1)ℊ(𝓏−1)d𝓏−1
𝜇
−𝜇
, (55) 
where ℊ(𝓏−1) is the ergodic density of 𝓏−1. It is simple to verify that ℰ(−𝜀𝑛⋆) = 1 −
ℰ(𝜀𝑛⋆)  implies ℋ̃
⋆(𝜍) = 1 − ℋ̃⋆(−𝜍) , provided ℊ(⋅)  also is symmetric, which we now 
establish. 
Our strategy is to conjecture that ℊ(⋅) is symmetric and verify that this is implied. 
Consider a firm with an initial 𝓏−1 = 𝓏 − 𝜀  such that 𝓏 ∈ (−𝜇, 𝜇) lies strictly inside the 
inaction range. Clearly, this firm migrates to 𝓏 if it draws 𝜀. Thus, the mass of firms at 
𝓏 this period is given by 
 ℊ(𝓏) = ∫ ℊ(𝓏 − 𝜀)
𝓏+𝜇
𝓏−𝜇
dℰ(𝜀) = ∫ ℊ(𝑦)
𝜇
−𝜇
dℰ(𝓏 − 𝑦), (56) 
where we have used the change of variable 𝑦 = 𝓏 − 𝜀. Under the conjecture that ℊ(𝑦) =
ℊ(−𝑦), one can confirm ℊ(𝓏) = ℊ(−𝓏). To see this, evaluate ℊ(⋅) at −𝑧, use symmetry 
of ℰ(⋅), a change of variable ?̃? = −𝑦, and standard rules of calculus to obtain 
 
ℊ(−𝓏) = ∫ ℊ(𝑦)
𝜇
−𝜇
dℰ(−𝓏 − 𝑦) = ∫ ℊ(𝑦)
𝜇
−𝜇
dℰ(𝑧 + 𝑦) = − ∫ ℊ(−?̃?)
−𝜇
𝜇
dℰ(𝑧 − ?̃?)
= ∫ ℊ(−𝑦)
𝜇
−𝜇
dℰ(𝑧 − 𝑦). 
(57) 
Now consider the mass at the lower adjustment barrier, 𝓏 = −𝜇. This is comprised 
of two parts: first, firms that begin at −𝜇, draw a negative labor demand shock (𝜀 < 0), 
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and adjust to remain at −𝜇; and second, firms that began away from −𝜇 and then 
migrate there. Thus, 
 ℊ(−𝜇) = ℰ(0)ℊ(−𝜇) + ∫ ℊ(−𝜇 + 𝜀)dℰ(−𝜀)
2𝜇
0
=
1
ℰ(0)
∫ ℊ(−𝜇 + 𝜀)dℰ(𝜀)
2𝜇
0
, (58) 
where the second equality follows from symmetry of ℰ(⋅). A similar argument can be 
used to show that the mass at the upper adjustment barrier 𝓏 = 𝜇 satisfies  
 ℊ(𝜇) =
1
ℰ(0)
∫ ℊ(𝜇 − 𝜀)dℰ(𝜀)
2𝜇
0
. (59) 
A conjecture of symmetry ℊ(−𝜇 + 𝜀) = ℊ(𝜇 − 𝜀) is again confirmed, ℊ(−𝜇) = ℊ(𝜇). It 
follows that ℊ(𝓏) = ℊ(−𝓏) for all  𝓏 ∈ [−𝜇, 𝜇], and symmetry of ℋ̃⋆(⋅) obtains. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The first-order conditions that define the triggers for optimal 
adjustment 𝑧 ∈ {1 𝑢⁄ , 1 𝑙⁄ } are given by 
 
𝑙1−𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷(1 𝑙⁄ ; 𝜃) ≡ 1, 
𝑢1−𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷(1 𝑢⁄ ; 𝜃) ≡ 1 +
𝛾
𝑞(𝜃)
, 
(60) 
where 𝐷(𝑧; 𝜃) ≡ 𝔼 [𝛱′ (𝑒−𝜀𝑛⋆
′
𝑧)]. The latter satisfies the following recursion 
 
𝐷(𝑧; 𝜃) = ∫ [𝑒(1−𝛼)𝜀𝑛⋆
′
𝑧𝛼−1 − 1 + 𝛽𝐷 (𝑒−𝜀𝑛⋆
′
𝑧; 𝜃)]
ln(𝑢𝑧)
ln(𝑙𝑧)
𝑑ℰ(𝜀𝑛⋆
′ )
+
𝛾
𝑞(𝜃)
[1 − ℰ(ln(𝑢𝑧))]. 
(61) 
We first consider a first-order approximation to the firm’s optimal policies around 𝛾 =
0.26 To this end, note first that 
 
𝐷𝛾(𝑧; 𝜃) ≈
1
𝑞(𝜃)
[1 − ℰ(ln(𝑢𝑧))] + 𝛽 ∫ 𝐷𝛾 (𝑒
−𝜀
𝑛⋆
′
𝑧; 𝜃)
ln(𝑢𝑧)
ln(𝑙𝑧)
𝑑ℰ(𝜀𝑛⋆
′ ) 
=
1
𝑞(𝜃)
[1 − ℰ(ln 𝑧)] when 𝛾 = 0. 
(62) 
Thus we can write 𝐷(𝑧; 𝜃) ≈ 𝛾[1 − ℰ(ln 𝑧)]/𝑞(𝜃) . Substituting into the first-order 
conditions and noting that 𝑙 = 𝑒−𝜆 and 𝑢 = 𝑒𝜐 yields 
                                      
26 Equation (52) has the form 𝐷(𝑧) = 𝒞(𝐷, 𝛾)(𝑧), where 𝒞 is a contraction map on the cross product of the 
space of bounded and continuous functions (where 𝐷  “lives”) and [0, Γ] , a closed subinterval of the 
nonnegative real line from which 𝛾 is drawn. By inspection, this map is continuously differentiable with 
respect to (w.r.t.) 𝛾 ∈ [0, Γ]. It then follows from Lemma 1 of Albrecht, Holmlund, and Lang (1991) that 
𝐷 is continuously differentiable w.r.t. 𝛾 and satisfies the recursion, 𝐷𝛾(𝑧) = 𝒞𝛾(𝐷, 𝛾)(𝑧) + 𝒞𝐷(𝐷𝛾 , 𝐷, 𝛾)(𝑧), 
where 𝒞𝐷  is the Frechet derivative of 𝒞 . The right side of the latter expression defines a(nother) 
contraction map on a space of bounded and continuous functions. We have, then, that 𝐷𝛾 is bounded and 
continuous on [0, Γ]. Its calculation in (62) follows. 
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𝑒−(1−𝛼)𝜆 + 𝛽
𝛾
𝑞(𝜃)
[1 − ℰ(𝜆)] ≈ 1, 
𝑒(1−𝛼)𝜐 + 𝛽
𝛾
𝑞(𝜃)
[1 − ℰ(−𝜐)] ≈ 1 +
𝛾
𝑞(𝜃)
. 
(63) 
Next, linearizing the leading terms around 𝜆 = 0 and 𝜐 = 0, respectively, leads to  
 
−(1 − 𝛼)𝜆 + 𝛽
𝛾
𝑞(𝜃)
[1 − ℰ(𝜆)] ≈ 0, 
(1 − 𝛼)𝜐 + 𝛽
𝛾
𝑞(𝜃)
[1 − ℰ(−𝜐)] ≈
𝛾
𝑞(𝜃)
. 
(64) 
Imposing 𝛽 ≈ 1, and ℰ(−𝜀) = 1 − ℰ(𝜀) yields 𝜆 ≈ 𝜐. 
Now return to the relationship between 𝛥?̂?  and 𝛥𝒩⋆  in equation (50). Time-
variation in the adjustment triggers alters the approximations around small aggregate 
shocks. Specifically, with 𝜆 ≈ 𝜐 ≈ 𝜇, equation (50) becomes 
 𝛥?̂? ≈
𝛥𝒩⋆
𝜙
+
1
𝜙
[𝛥 (𝜇 ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
−𝜇
−∞
) − 𝛥 (𝜇 ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∞
𝜇
)] −
1
𝜙
𝛥 (∫ 𝑧?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜇
−𝜇
). (65) 
In order to take a first-order approximation around 𝛥𝒩⋆ = 0, note that 
 
𝜕𝛥(𝜇 ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
−𝜇
−∞
)
𝜕𝛥𝒩⋆
|
𝛥𝒩⋆=0
= −𝜇−1?̃?−1
⋆ (−𝜇−1) 
+{ℋ̃−1
⋆ (−𝜇−1) − 𝜇−1?̃?−1
⋆ (−𝜇−1)}
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝛥𝒩⋆
|
𝛥𝒩⋆=0
; 
(66) 
similarly, 
 
𝜕𝛥 (𝜇 ∫ ?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∞
𝜇
)
𝜕𝛥𝒩⋆
|
𝛥𝒩⋆=0
= 𝜇−1?̃?−1
⋆ (𝜇−1) 
+{1 − ℋ̃−1
⋆ (𝜇−1) − 𝜇−1?̃?−1
⋆ (𝜇−1)}
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝛥𝒩⋆
|
𝛥𝒩⋆=0
; 
(67) 
and, 
 
𝜕𝛥 (∫ 𝑧?̃?⋆(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝜇
−𝜇
)
𝜕𝛥𝒩⋆
|
𝛥𝒩⋆=0
= 1 − 𝜙−1 − 𝜇−1[?̃?−1
⋆ (𝜇−1) + ?̃?−1
⋆ (−𝜇−1)] 
+𝜇−1[?̃?−1
⋆ (𝜇−1) − ?̃?−1
⋆ (−𝜇−1)]
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝛥𝒩⋆
|
𝛥𝒩⋆=0
. 
(68) 
Using these and (65) it follows that, to a first-order approximation around 𝛥𝒩⋆ = 0, 
 𝛥?̂? ≈ 𝛥𝒩⋆ +
1
𝜙−1
{ℋ̃−1
⋆ (−𝜇−1) − [1 − ℋ̃−1
⋆ (𝜇−1)]}
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝛥𝒩⋆
|
𝛥𝒩⋆=0
⋅ 𝛥𝒩⋆. (69) 
To complete the proof, note from Lemma 2 that symmetry of the adjustment barriers, 
and of ℰ(⋅) , implies that ℋ̃⋆(⋅)  is also symmetric. It follows that ℋ̃−1
⋆ (−𝜇−1) −
[1 − ℋ̃−1
⋆ (𝜇−1)] ≈ 0 , and (69) collapses to 𝛥?̂? ≈ 𝛥𝒩
⋆ . The result then follows from 
equation (53). 
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Numerical model. Our numerical results are derived from a model that augments the 
firm’s problem (16) with a time-invariant per-worker hiring cost 𝑘 as follows: 
 
𝛱(𝑛−1, 𝑥) ≡ max
𝑛
{𝐴𝑝𝑥𝑛𝛼 − (1 − 𝜂)𝜔𝑛 − (
𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
+ 𝑘) 𝛥𝑛+ + 𝛽𝔼[𝛱(𝑛, 𝑥′)|𝑥]} , 
where 𝐴 ≡
1 − 𝜂
1 − 𝜂(1 − 𝛼)
, 
(70) 
and the workers’ threat point 𝜔 is given by (19). The model is solved at a bi-weekly 
frequency as a means to approximate the continuous time nature of labor market flows. 
We now describe how we set values of the structural parameters not described in 
section 1.5. Three of the remaining parameters are the size of the labor force 𝐿, the 
standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity draws 𝜎𝑥 , and the flow payoff from 
unemployment 𝑏 . In any steady state, total hires equal the outflows from 
unemployment. Hence, the labor force, for a given level of hires, determines the outflow 
rate 𝑓 , which we target to equal its empirical counterpart of 0.232 at a biweekly 
frequency. (This is calculated in the data based on the method of Shimer (2005) for the 
period 1951 to 2015.)  To replicate an average unemployment rate 𝑢 of 6 percent, we set 
the inflow rate into unemployment at 0.0145 per fortnight by adjusting 𝜎𝑥 . Finally, 
conditional on an unemployment rate, we can set 𝑏 to ensure an average establishment 
size in the range of 17-21 employees, consistent with Census Bureau data on average 
establishment and firm size. 
To map the job finding rate 𝑓  to labor market tightness 𝜃 , we assume a 
conventional Cobb-Douglas matching function that implies the job-finding rate 𝑓 = 𝑚𝜃𝜑 
where 𝑚 denotes matching efficiency. Using data for the period 1951 to 2015, and the 
methods of Shimer (2005), we estimate a matching elasticity 𝜑 = 1/3. We then choose 
matching efficiency 𝑚 = 0.29 so that the observed mean of tightness is consistent with a 
job-finding rate of 𝑓 = 0.232 (as in Pissarides 2009). This yields 𝜃 = 0.53 and a vacancy 
rate, of 3.2 percent. The values of these additional parameters underlying the resulting 
calibrations are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Parameters by inaction rate underlying numerical search model 
Parameter Meaning 
Values by inaction rate 
Reason 
52.5% 67% 80% 
𝜂 Worker bargain power 0.063 0.026 0.009 Real wage as procyclical as employment 
𝑏 Unemployment payoff 0.22 0.21 0.19 Average employer size 
𝐿 Labor force 19.15 19.83 19.57 Mean job-finding rate 
𝜎𝑥 Std. of 𝑥 innovations 0.28 0.47 0.83 Mean unemployment inflow rate 
𝑘 Hiring cost 0.72 2.42 7.20 Inaction rate 
 
